In the following pages of the ruling, which are again fill of redactions, it is nevertheless possible to glimpse the progress of this game that was not only grim and cynical, but also potentially deadly (because, as a prisoner put forward for a trial by Military Commission, it was always possible that the government would have pressed for the death sentence had al-Rabiah been convicted).
For page after page the distressing truth peeks out: al-Rabiah "did not know what to admit when his interrogators explained that his "full confession did not incorporate a description concerning a suitcase full of money that he allegedly gave bin Laden ; they "began to question the truthfulness of his confessions almost immediately ; they "began ˜grilling' al-Rabiah concerning [redacted] ; al-Rabiah "was interrogated [redacted] during which he made a full confession regarding his activities at Tora Bora ; interrogators "pressed for additional details concerning Tora Bora ; they "became increasingly convinced that his confessions [redacted] ; they "concluded in one interrogation report [redacted] ; "One week later, his interrogator concluded [redacted] ; "After several additional interrogation sessions, al-Rabiah's interrogators concluded simply [redacted].
Readers can fill in the gaps through the judge's response to the redacted passages. "Incredibly, she wrote, "these are the confessions that the Government has asked the Court to accept as truthful in this case.
Al-Rabiah explains his cooperation with the interrogators; threats and punishment described
Judge Kollar-Kotelly then dismissed further allegations, which again, were mostly redacted but included the following ironic gem: "The Government has not even attempted to explain how someone with no known connection to al-Wafa [a Saudi charity regarded, during Guantà namo's "witch-hunt phase, with particular suspicion] and who had never even been to Afghanistan longer than a few weeks could ascend to such an honored position, and no credible explanation is contained in the record.
She then moved on to al-Rabiah's own explanations of how he came to make false confessions, noting that he had stated that, shortly after his arrival at Guantà namo, "a senior [redacted] interrogator came to me and said, ˜There is nothing against you. But there is no innocent person here. So, you should confess to something so you can be charged and sentenced and serve your sentence and then go back to your family and country, because you will not leave this place innocent.
This is deeply disturbing, of course, as it indicates that at least one senior interrogator recognized that the Bush administration's refusal to recognize that there were innocent men at Guantà namo -- and it has been clear for many years that hundreds of innocent men were held, who had no connection whatsoever to any form of militancy, let alone terrorism -- had set in motion a system in which, whether voluntarily or not, all the innocent men at Guantà namo were expected to make false confessions, either so that they could continue to be labeled as "enemy combatants on release, to maintain the illusion that Guantà namo was full of "the worst of the worst, or, as in al-Rabiah's case, so that they could be tricked and transformed into terrorist sympathizers and facilitators.
For some (and it has been confirmed by a former interrogator that at least 100 prisoners in Guantà namo were subjected to SERE-derived "enhanced interrogation ), confessions clearly came easily, and without the use of abuse or torture, but for others, including al-Rabiah, "pressure was involved. Judge Kollar-Kotelly drew on a declaration from March this year, in which he explained that his confessions arose out of "scenarios offered " by [his] interrogators " which [he] believed to be the story they wanted [him] to tell and which [he] felt pressured to adopt (emphasis added). As he also explained:
[M]y interrogators told me they knew I had met with Osama bin Laden, that other detainees had said I met with Osama bin Laden, that there was nothing wrong with simply meeting Osama bin Laden, and that I should admit meeting him so I could be sent home " In about August 2004, shortly before my CSRT hearing [the tribunal at which al-Rabiah repeated his approved confessions in detail], my interrogators told me the CSRT was just a show that would allow the United States to "save face. My interrogators told me no one leaves Guantà namo innocent, and told me I would be sent home to Kuwait if I "admitted some of the false things I had said in my interrogations. The interrogators also told me that I would never go home again if I denied these things, because the United States government would never admit I had been wrongly held.
In a key passage, he spelled out what being "pressured meant. As the judge explained, he stated that "he made his confessions to reduce the abuse meted out by his interrogators ˜to obtain confessions that suited what [they] thought they knew or what they wanted [him] to say.' He maintained his confessions over time because ˜the interrogators would continue to abuse me anytime I attempted to repudiate any of these false allegations.' As she also noted:
There is substantial evidence in the record supporting al-Rabiah's claims. The record is replete with examples of al-Rabiah's interrogators emphasizing a stark dichotomy -- if he confessed to the allegations against him, his case would be turned over to [redacted] so that he could return to Kuwait; if he did not confess, he would not return to Kuwait, and his life would become increasingly miserable.
Through the veil of redactions, it is clear that al-Rabiah attempted, on more than one occasion, to withdraw his confessions, but that his interrogators threatened to withdraw something (food? comfort items?) as a result, and Judge Kollar-Kotelly also noted that punishment, as well as the threat of punishment, was meted out to him. "The record, she wrote, "also supports al-Rabiah's claims that he was punished for recanting. Examples provided by the judge were redacted, but the following passage, in which she discussed further abuse as a result of the interrogators' frustrations regarding al-Rabiah's inability to invent a coherent false narrative, was not. She wrote:
The record contains evidence that al-Rabiah's interrogators became increasingly frustrated because his confessions contained numerous inconsistencies or implausibilities. As a result, al-Rabiah's interrogators began using abusive techniques that violated the Army Field Manual and the 1949 Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War. The first of these techniques included threats of rendition to places where al-Rabiah would either be tortured and/or would never be found.
These threats were made on at least four occasions, and, as the judge explained, "were also reinforced by placing al-Rabiah into the frequent flier program, discussed above. It is also apparent that the threats continued throughout this period, as the judge also noted that "al-Rabiah's interrogators continued to threaten him [redacted].
After making a point that, as explained in the Army Field Manual, "prohibited techniques [are] not necessary to gain the cooperation of interrogation sources, and, in fact, that the use of these methods is likely to "yield unreliable results, may damage subsequent collection efforts, and can induce the source to say what he thinks the interrogator wants to hear, Judge Kollar-Kotelly added that, "Underscoring the impropriety of these techniques is the fact that [redacted], al-Rabiah's lead interrogator, was disciplined for making similar threats during the same period toward a Guantà namo detainee who was also one of the alleged eyewitnesses against al-Rabiah " for which he was disciplined (the details, predictably, were redacted).
Judge Kollar-Kotelly's devastating conclusions
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