Of course, they spew yet more propaganda designed to maintain or bolster the 70 percent of Republicans who still support Bush's criminal war. (How different are they from Hitler's die-hard supporters during World War II?) For example, one of the more obnoxious and consistently wrong neo-cons, Charles Krauthammer, waxed euphoric in his November 23rd column about just how well the surge was going in Iraq.
Yet, the 23rd was the day of the pet market blast, which had followed the previous day's "brazen attack" in the southern belt of Baghdad and the rocket attack on the Green Zone. Those attacks prompted two reporters from the Los Angeles Times to suggest that "insurgents appeared intent on sending a message to U.S. and Iraqi officials that their recent expressions of optimism on the nation's security were premature."
But, then, consider the source. This is the very same Krauthammer who wrote in November 2001: [T]he way to tame the Arab street is not with appeasement and sweet sensitivity but with raw power and victory….The elementary truth that seems to elude the experts again and again…is that power is its own reward. Victory changes everything, psychology above all. The psychology in the [Middle East] is now one of fear and deep respect for American power. Now is the time to use it." [Andrew J. Bacevich, The New American Militarism, p 93]
Tell me, Mr. Krauthammer, how's the "fear and deep respect" playing out in the Middle East and the world in November 2007? How stupid could you be? And why are you still employed by the Washington Post?
The Post's Thomas Ricks provides a more honest assessment. "I just got back from Baghdad last week, and it was clear that violence has decreased. But it hasn't gone away. It is only back down to the 2005 level - which to my mind is kind of like moving from the eighth circle of hell to the fifth….I've interviewed dozens of officers and none were willing to say we are winning. What they were saying is that at least now, we are not losing." [Editor & Publisher, Nov. 24, 2007] Yet, if you recall that, on May 12, 2004, General Richard Myers, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of staff, told a Senate committee, "There is no way to militarily lose in Iraq. There's also no way to militarily win in Iraq," you might want to question why we're still there.
Anthony Cordesman recently published a more realistic appraisal of the surge. Titled, "Violence versus Political Accommodation: The True Elements of Victory in Iraq," Cordesman credits the surge for playing a secondary role in reducing violence in Iraq. But he cautions: "It is still far from clear that US success against al Qaeda in the rest of central Iraq has brought stability and security to any mixed area where there is serious tension and violence. If anything, the fact that the 'surge' has not halted the pace of Iraqi displacements and has often created a patchwork of Arab Shiite versus Arab Sunni divisions in towns and areas that extend far beyond Baghdad, has laid the ground for further struggles once the US is gone." [p. 11]
Cordesman adds: "Most of Southern Iraq is now under the control of competing local and regional Shiite gangs," which have become the "equivalent of rival mafias." [p. 13]
More significantly, Cordesman concludes: "The US cannot win the war; it can only give Iraq's central government and those leaders interested in national unity and political accommodation the opportunity to do so." [p. 10] [N]o amount of American military success can - by itself - have strategic meaning." [p. 13]
Finally, those who propagandize that the "surge" is working are advised to contemplate the work of MIT economist Michael Greenstone. As summarized in the December issue of The Atlantic, Greenstone has examined the financial markets in Iraq, especially the market for Iraqi state bonds. He found that "from the start of the surge earlier this year until September, there was a 'sharp decline' in the price of Iraqi state bonds, signaling a '40% increase in the market's expectation that Iraq will default' on its obligations."
The Atlantic article goes on to note: "Since the bonds are sold on international markets (hedge funds hold a large portion), where the profit motive eliminates personal and political bias, the trajectory of bond prices may be the most accurate indicator available for assessing America's military strategy. And the data suggest that 'the surge is failing to pave the way toward a stable Iraq and may in fact be undermining it." [The Atlantic Dec. 2007, p. 26]
Consequently, were we merely limiting ourselves to the catastrophes that has bedeviled both the United States and Iraq as a consequence of Bush's war, we'd be forced to conclude that Bush's national security policy has the touch of King Midas in reverse. Everything Bush touches turns to sh*t!
Unfortunately, as serious pre-war scholars and critics feared and predicted, Bush's King Midas touch in reverse has extended far beyond Iraq and the United States. Simply recall their warnings about the war's impact on the price of oil, their fears that such a war might undermine US efforts against al Qaeda and the Taliban in Afghanistan, their concern that Bush's invasion might inflame hatred of America throughout the Muslim world, their suspicions that Iran might be the principal beneficiary of a US-led invasion that placed Iraqi Shiites in power and their worries about how a destabilized Iraq might provoke intervention by it neighbors, Iran, Syria and Turkey, and thus embroil the entire region.
Thanks to the perverse King Midas touch of the Bush administration, Iran has indeed emerged as the most influential player in Iraq and Turkey is poised to invade Iraqi Kurdistan. Moreover, as Anne Applebaum has written in the Washington Post: [T] he collateral damage inflicted by the war on America's relationships with the rest of the world is a lot deeper and broader than most Americans have realized."
In support of Ms. Applebaum's assertion, simply recall the words uttered to Condoleezza Rice in October 2007 by Tanya Lokshina, chairwoman of the Demos Center for Information and Research, a Russian human rights organization: The United States had "lost the high moral ground." "The American voice alone doesn't work anymore…The Russians are not influenced by it." [Steven Lee Myers, New York Times Oct. 15, 2007]
Finally, mention also must be made of another catastrophe feared and predicted by the pre-war critics of Bush's invasion, one which now looms on the horizon: the destabilization of nuclear armed Pakistan. As Robert Parry wrote in September 2002, "One reason a war with Iraq might increase, rather than decrease, the danger to the American people is that the invasion could spread instability across the Middle East and throughout the Muslim world…[impacting] most notably the dictatorship of Gen. Pervez Musharraf in Pakistan."
As Parry observed: "Today, even as Musharraf cooperates with the U.S. war on terror, his regime is confronted by pro-al Qaeda factions both inside and outside his government. Many past and present Pakistani military officers continue to sympathize with the fundamentalists." [Robert Parry, "Bush's Nuclear Gamble," [consortiumnews.com, September 30, 2002]