After that zinger at the Bush administration's expense, Mr. Bhadrakumar describes what will happen in the event of an attack. "Indeed, if the Bush administration does finally decide to do something as unwise as to strike Iran militarily, Iranian nationalism will overflow." He explains that the "Iranian revolution's strong social base (the further one moves away from Tehran's middle class, the more palpable it appears to a traveler) hasn't withered away. . . . It can be invoked by the leadership at short notice with devastating effect."
In fact, he adds, the conceit that the regime has no public support is a "completely myopic idea." Consistent with Ms. Farhi's view that the combative nature of Tehran's internal politics is an asset, he believes that, "Iran's vibrant political life, and the garrulous nature of the Persians are not being taken into account by those outsiders making facile judgements such as that the regime is divided and is alienated from the public."
Finally, he cautions the administration that it's "dangerous to take one's own propaganda seriously."
As Mohsen Rezaee, the Iranian official Ms. Farhi quoted earlier, affirmed, the Iranian government "is prepared for the kind of attacks the US is entertaining." Still, it seems to us that a slumbering Iranian public, wakened with a start, might lend an American attack an element of surprise that by all rights it doesn't deserve since it's been "on the table" for years. Thus wounded, like the US after Pearl Harbor and 9/11, it might rally round the flag that much more quickly than if it had been living in dread for years.
In the meantime, it might help our perspective to imagine what aircraft carrier groups massed outside your country feels like. Since the executive branch and the ruling mullahs are married to uranium enrichment, it's too late for Iranians to call their majlis (parliament) representatives and ask them to vote against it. In the same situation, we too might yield to the temptation to shield our eyes from the winds of war whipping up around us.
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