Due to government's reluctance to re-consider past decisions, flaws are only now coming to light. There is also the practicality of this technology to consider. With even the largest precincts processing no more than 5,000 votes, the use of electronic systems to count ballots is essentially overkill. It's akin to dropping a bomb on an anthill as a pest control measure; a far less advanced form of technology would be just as effective and would cost much less. Furthermore, it makes no sense to purchase or lease expensive equipment only to have it stored until the one or two elections per year take place.
The companies vying for government contracts routinely involve themselves in what look to be conflicts of interest. For instance, In San Diego County, the current registrar of voters, Deborah Seiler, was the very person who sold the county its voting machines prior to the time she gained office. In numerous states, election officials appear on voting manufacturers' marketing brochures. Confidence in the process suffers. In some cases, the very politicians who push electronic voting initiatives receive donations from manufacturers of voting systems. Not only does this raise concerns of propriety, one has to wonder if there isn't more than meets the eye. If there is anyone with an interest in manipulating an election result it is the incumbent politician. Even if it weren't possible, this alone would create distrust.
There are areas where technology can improve the voting process. Ballots can be hard to produce. Some mechanical systems require expensive, perforated cards (hanging chad anyone?). Machines which create the paper ballots – as long as the ballot is human-readable, can be useful in significantly reducing printing costs and waste. On-demand ballot printing can save enormous costs and planning since there is no guesswork involved as to ballot quantity vs. voter turnout. It can also shorten the time when ballot changes can be made. There have been many cases where due to errors or passed deadlines, candidates who should have been on the ballot didn't show up on the ballot by election day.
Unless they are paperless, machines which allow voters to select their choices are not inherently untrustworthy since they can't affect outcomes. They merely assist the voter in making selections. (However, a simple laptop and a web browser can do that too).
The fundamental problem with electronic voting systems is not the ballot but the counting of those ballots. What occurs inside the electronic ballot scanner or counting system can't be verified by anyone but the manufacturer. It's simply impossible for the average voter to know if the votes are being counted accurately. They are relegated to depending on the word of government officials and their suppliers to tell them the truth. ("Yes, we fooled you all that time but we'll be good from now on.")
So what's the solution? Go low tech on the counting side of the equation. By manually counting paper ballots, integrity and trust is restored. The time savings and convenience don't outweigh the costs when you factor in the distrust a closed, unverifiable system creates. For almost 200 years, most elections in the U.S. were handled this way. No, this doesn't alleviate fraud. It does potentially save billions of dollars to the taxpayer by eliminating unnecessary technology purchases while restoring accountability in the electoral system.
Without accountability and transparency in our electoral system, technology additions do not provide any value no matter how persuasive are their advocates.
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