This was a great read

As with the NY Amici, it seems we were both simultaneously reviewing the same material and writing articles from totally different angles.  I like that you expanded on many themes from the Times article, citing many other sources and rounding out the picture more carefully than the attempt at a big picture view that the Times piece provides.

One point you made that I hadn't seen before and really liked:

Many people feel confident with optical scan systems since they are used in school exams.  They fail to recognize, tho, that test results can be directly questioned by a student whose name is on a specific test answer sheet.  This is not possible with anonymous ballots.

My piece is up at We Do Not Consent and hopefully will appear here at OpEdNews shortly.

Peace,

Dave 

by Dave Berman (46 articles, 0 quicklinks, 7 diaries, 47 comments) on Sunday, January 6, 2008 at 2:24:17 AM
 

Berman's Piece Shows More Faults

with the NYTimes article.  Be sure to read it at http://wedonotconsent.blogspot.com/2008/01/nytimes-can-you-count-on-these-machines.html

Yeah, I was excited to read your piece last nite... and again noted how our articles complement each other.  We're such a team, Dave - even without directly trying to be...

by Rady Ananda (127 articles, 289 quicklinks, 37 diaries, 1124 comments) on Sunday, January 6, 2008 at 9:23:16 AM
 

The problem is complex and the solution is simple

Computer based vote counting systems are vulnerable.  Survival of our Constitutional democracy requires hand-counted paper-ballots with an active citizenry involved in a transparent process.

How we count the votes is more important than even casting the ballots.  Trusting vulnerable computer software to tabulate the votes is like blindly putting ballots in a blender and hoping that our votes comes out correctly counted. 

I commit to re-reading the Black Box Voting Citizen's Toolkit and taking on at least one action.  I hope you care enough about our Democracy to do the same. 

by Tim Riley (7 articles, 5 quicklinks, 7 diaries, 132 comments) on Sunday, January 6, 2008 at 2:58:30 AM
 

BBV's Citizen's Tool Kit

Thanks for providing the link to this recipe book - it's especially important as we build a base of citizens actively engaged in observing the election process.

As Abe Lincoln said, "Elections belong to the people.  Let them decide."

by Rady Ananda (127 articles, 289 quicklinks, 37 diaries, 1124 comments) on Sunday, January 6, 2008 at 9:28:17 AM
 

A good thing

For those of us in the voting integrity grassroots, the NYT article is all old news, however, it remains an excellent wake up tool for those readers who have lived ignorant to the issues.

It would be nice to see articles that speak to the falicy of voting into cyber space. Cyber space is a very esoteric place. Only a relative handful of very special people even know how to create it, access it and work within its confines. Cyber space is opaque to the average voting American. And it should be the average voting American around which a transparent voting system is built.

Transparency needs to be the ultimate goal of any voting methodology. At the end of the day if the voting process cannot be checked and verified by an average literate English speaking American, then that process of voting is unacceptable as an official voting process. Voting into cyber space functions at the opposite end of the transparency spectrum.

Simply, software and transparency are forever contradictory terms.

These are the good old days. The machines that access cyber space are flawed, thus, they have allowed us to address the flawed idea of voting into cyber space. Can you imagine where we would be had the black box voting process worked from the get go? Transparency would be over, and the integrity of American Democracy along with it.

So, don't fear black box voting because it is flawed, fear it because at some distant point in time black box voting will work within a margin of error that no argument will be able to defeat.

We have a window of opportunity to convert the process to a purely paper based voting system. But that clock is ticking at breakneck speed, and we are dealing with a population where an aging Orwelian generation is being replaced by a generation of people that have known nothing other than the convenience of cyber space, thus, they will embrace its use for virtually anything.

Tic Toc Tic Toc

by James Strait (39 articles, 0 quicklinks, 7 diaries, 192 comments) on Sunday, January 6, 2008 at 8:15:00 AM
 

Winning the Hearts & Minds of Our Nation's Youth

I've considered this notion about the youth and computers - given their familiarity as you point out, Jim.  I've heard others note that youth is also more famiiliar (than us grannies) with how easy it is to hack computers.

So, while we continue to try to reach the youth, I think we should continue to promote the notion that citizen-run elections (vs. government run ones) are in democracy's best interest.  Independent electoral management bodies exemplify democracy in action.

Internet voting, to me, isn't the most immediate fire that needs to be doused. Right now, we need to confront absentee voting, vote by mail, and Ohio Sec'y of State's new plan to expand voting to 14 days.  Talk about complicating a process, which only serves to further obscure checks and balances and chain of custody.

Another immediate fire, in my mind, is centralized vote tabulation.  How can we possibly check official's report of vote totals when we can't compare precinct level data with official report of precinct level data?  Plus, all the scientific literature condemns centralized vote tabulation, as well as international experts who promote decentralization. 

Clearly, election officials (or Jennifer Brunner in particular) seek to further obscure elections by removing checks and balances by citizen observers. 

She was also thrilled with former Secy of State J. Kenneth Blackwell's move to engage 17-year olds in poll work, because "teens don't fear computers."  So, you nail the salient issue when we face the propagandizing toward computerized elections.

by Rady Ananda (127 articles, 289 quicklinks, 37 diaries, 1124 comments) on Sunday, January 6, 2008 at 9:45:46 AM
 

great article, rady!

wonderful job tying everything together.  everyone: after reading Rady's and Dave's articles, go and write the NYTimes and make a plea for more in-depth coverage, dealing with the issues of secret vote counting and the many problems with op-scans.

if we write enough articles, there's a chance that they may publish one... 

by Joan Brunwasser (164 articles, 3539 quicklinks, 3 diaries, 634 comments) on Sunday, January 6, 2008 at 5:59:14 PM
 

Letter to the Editor - NYTimes

(Thanks, Joan, for the kudos, and for this good idea) 

From the NYTimes website:

Letters to the editor should only be sent to The Times, and not to other publications. We do not publish open letters or third-party letters.

Letters for publication should be no longer than 150 words, must refer to an article that has appeared within the last seven days, and must include the writer's address and phone numbers. No attachments, please.

We regret we cannot return or acknowledge unpublished letters. Writers of those letters selected for publication will be notified within a week. Letters may be shortened for space requirements.

Send a letter to the editor by e-mailing letters@nytimes.com or faxing (212)556-3622.

You may also mail your letter to:

Letters to the Editor
The New York Times
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New York, NY 10018

To submit a letter to the City, Long Island, Westchester, New Jersey or Connecticut weekly sections, please e-mail region@nytimes.com..

About Letters
Thomas Feyer, the letters editor, gives tips for getting your letter published. Click here for full article.

Additional Information?

by Rady Ananda (127 articles, 289 quicklinks, 37 diaries, 1124 comments) on Sunday, January 6, 2008 at 7:31:18 PM
 

OptiScams are No Improvement

This was such a good exchange, I thought I'd post it here, since this article prompted it.  I've deleted any references that might breach his anonymity: 

Thanks for your comment, ANON ~ altho I don't know why you didn't post it on the article.  ?  I'll respond here, this time.

If the entire security industry tells you your castle is not secure, and you only lock the front door, is that really an improvement?

If they tell you to go away on vacation, and you can check when you get back, to see if anything was taken, is this second step more important than securing the castle before you leave town? 

The priority goes to the first count - not the later one.

Election history in the US reveals a common understanding that the first count must be right - and all security procedures go toward that end.  (Thank you Andi Novick for THAT bit of research!)

Over time, this has been thwarted by those in power because citizens stopped paying attention.  Now the goverment is implementing laws to make elections totally opaque (e.g. mail-in-voting, two-week voting periods, centralized counts, statewide computerized databases, etc.), and more difficult to vote, e.g. voter ID.

Audits and recounts involving software-driven systems will not get to the truth, because the true vote count has been obscured. We can never know if self-erasing software corrupted the vote. Also, the chain of custody involved in post election activities often fails.

I have observed three recounts (all in Ohio), finding that election administration was a joke when it came to transparency and security.  Recounts and audits require even more of a "Trust Us" posture, which should never be the case when it comes to elections.

No, we must get it right on election night.  The first count is what must be secure - we do not accept post election audits and recounts as a healthy step toward free and fair elections.

Audits and recounts do not remove inherent uncertainty.  That's the priority - and it is addressed in the first count.

Again, get it right on election night.

Respectfully,

~ Rady

----- Original Message -----
Sent: Sunday, January 6, 2008  10:29:13 AM

Dear Ms. Ananda,

Your article on the NYTimes voting equipment piece is certainly correct that the Times did understate the problems with optical scan equipment.  However, your concerns about optical scan equipment ignore the improvement that they represent.  Elections held on DREs cannot be audited independently, elections held on opti-scan equipment can. 

Here in ****** we have been working hard to get the local board of elections to drop the use of DREs in favor of optical scan equipment.  (NB They only have enough DREs for 35% of the turnout in big elections.  The rest is covered with one optical scan unit at each polling place.) We are doing this for two reasons. 

First, the potential for doing an audit based on independent statement of voter intent represents a huge increase in the likelihood of electronic election rigging being caught.  Second, they already have the needed equipment, so our solution represents a change in policy, not a large financial outlay for new equipment.  You are right about opti-scan (and any software-based system) being highly flawed, but perhaps you have overstated the risk to our democracy of not using this solution.

The real problem isn't the technology.  It is the standards for an election.  For example, in Missouri there is no definition of the "official" record of the vote.  The Secretary of State's office here says that a judge can decide what the official record is, if that becomes necessary. 

Also--and most importantly--there is no definition of a failed election.  The Missouri regulations guiding boards of elections in their certification techniques basically say, if the various counts don't agree, keep counting until you can agree on the election outcome.

The certification of an election should meet a national standard that the board of elections certifying the election is statistically 95% certain that the totals from the software accurately represent the sum of the voters intent based on independent confirmation from random sampling of the counts.  By setting a standard, instead of trying to write rules for everything that can happen in an election, improvement of the election process will proceed from having a clear objective that each board of election will have to meet or face dispute over their results.

Finally, most systems that use computers are completely dependent on effective auditing to be certain that software problems (both malicious and benign)are not present.  For example, no public company would be able to sell common stock on the stock market based on computerized book keeping systems with the audit standards that we accept for the certification of an election.  The risk of undisclosed business problems would be too large. 

Effective audits for elections are, in my opinion, much more important than the choice of the technology for counting the vote. 

Thank you for the opportunity to share my thoughts with you on this subject.

Sincerely 
 

by Rady Ananda (127 articles, 289 quicklinks, 37 diaries, 1124 comments) on Saturday, January 12, 2008 at 11:09:57 PM