The National Bio Agro Defense Facility's "Dual Use" Research, A Threat to our Nation's Security

The National Bio Agro Defense Facility will engage in the very "Dual use" technology research that prompted the justification for the Bio Weapons Convention (BWC) and evidence exist that the threat assessment for misuse is increasing with the boom in bio- defense weapons programs.

An Acknowledged threat "the Dual Use Dilemma"

In October 2004, the Committee on Research Standards and Practices to Prevent the Destructive Application of Biotechnology, the National Research Council authored a report/book entitled; Biotechnology Research in an Age of Terrorism to examine the "Dual Use Dilemma" of biotechnology research with pathogenic microorganisms. The report is also referred to by some in the scientific community as the "Fink Report". Here is an excerpt from the committee's introduction:

"The charge to our Committee was to consider ways to minimize threats from biological warfare and bioterrorism without hindering the progress of biotechnology, which is essential for the health of the nation. This task is complicated because almost all biotechnology in service of human health can be subverted for misuse by hostile individuals or nations. The major vehicles of bioterrorism, at least in the near term, are likely to be based on materials and techniques that are available throughout the world and are easily acquired. Most importantly, a critical element of our defense against bioterrorism is the accelerated development of biotechnology to advance our ability to detect and cure disease. Since the development of biotechnology is facilitated by the sharing of ideas and materials, open communication offers the best security against bioterrorism. The tension between the spread of technologies that protect us and the spread of technologies that threaten us is the crux of the dilemma. Although the National Academies have had many reports on national security, this is the first to deal specifically with national security and the life sciences".

The committee stated, "The duality between the purposes permitted and prohibited under the BWC, (Bio Weapons Convention) was at the heart of committee's activities".

The committee adopted "Seven experiments of concern" they are as follows:

• Demonstrate how to render a vaccine ineffective
• Confer resistance to therapeutically useful antibiotics or antiviral agents
• Enhance the virulence of a pathogen or render a nonpathogen virulent
• Increase transmissibility of a pathogen
• Alter the host range of a pathogen
• Enable the evasion of diagnostic/detection modalities
• Enable the weaponization of a biological agent or toxin

The research currently being performed at Plum Island Animal Disease Center is considered dual use research and clearly, PIADC research activities include "the seven experiments of concern". This research will be transferred to the National Bio Agro Defense Facility once the facility is operational. The National Institutes of Health (NIH) has established institution oversight and guidelines for these types of facilities using recombinant DNA Research (rDNA). Each institution is responsible for ensuring that all rDNA research conducted at or sponsored by that institution is conducted in compliance with the NIH Guidelines.

Facilities using rDNA research are required to establish their own Institution Biosafety Committees (IBC's) which are to be provided to the public per request. As proven by the Sunshine Project's research the IBC requirement is a mere inconvenience and given the fact there is no oversight, it is up to the individual institution to police its own activities. The Sunshine Project has made available the Institution Bio Safety Minutes (IBC's) minutes from 211 institutions. Some institutions meet monthly, some meet quarterly and others rarely meet, this is a clear violation of NIH guidelines and it puts our national security at risk. One IBC of interest is from the University of South Carolina whose President sits on a BioSafety agency board created due to concerns brought forth in the "Fink Report", the NSABB .

In response to the dual use dilemma the "Fink Report" addressed, a new agency was created and charged with the task of bio-security advice and recommendations not oversight. In March of 2004, former Health and Human Services Secretary, Tommy G. Thompson, announced the creation of the National Science Advisory Broad for BioSecurity, (NSABB). The NSABB, since its June 30 2005 inaugural meeting, has met seven times in three years. Since the agency's inception security breaches, accidents and safety concerns relating to bio-containment facilities have increased exponentially . Unless renewed the charter of the NSABB will expire April 7, 2008. Given the fact that voting members of this agency do not follow established NIH protocol for dual use research there is no point in renewing the charter. It will only waste more taxpayer's hard-earned dollars.

In closing ask yourself; could the very definition of a bioweapons be defined; merely by intent, code of conduct and scientific ethics with who has possession of the select agent and specific biotechnology? When one considers dual use research clearly, the answer is yes. Consider for a moment our reasons for invading Iraq; which was their proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), their uses and their potential uses against humanity. The US attacked Iraq for the misuse of the dual use technology the US sold to them in the Reagan and Bush 1's administration . The National Bio Agro Defense Facility will not protect our nation; it will only cultivate more dangerous technology and if misapplied that technology could be our undoing.

Do you feel safer now?

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