The corollary should be obvious. If the existing framework continues to dominate debate about Iran, there can only be one possible outcome. It’s acknowledged that this outcome will be undesirable and counterproductive, but deemed necessary nonetheless because of the lack of alternatives. Alternatives are, however, possible, if we are willing to recognize certain truths, set aside certain assumptions, and dispense with certain falsehoods and misconceptions contained within the accepted framework.

We could, for instance, begin with the alternative assumptions that Iran’s leaders are no more or less capable of rational thought than Western leaders, that there should be a burden of proof upon those seeking to justify a resort to violence, that violence and aggression by the U.S. would be just as wrong as violence and aggression by Iran, that the U.S. and other Western countries should, as they demand of Iran, meet their obligations under existing treaties to which they are party, and that there are alternatives to doing nothing or bombing Iran which would be in the best interests of everyone involved.

Present U.S. policy towards Iran, as was the policy towards Iraq, is designed to be self-fulfilling; the U.S. declares that Iran is a threat because it intends to build and perhaps to use nuclear weapons, so it then acts in ways predicted to increase the chances that this will occur. This is a common theme of U.S. foreign policy, just as it was the judgment of the intelligence community that Iraq would not likely use WMD against the U.S. (assuming it had WMD) unless it was attacked. In that case, as here, the U.S. acted not to mitigate the possibility of the very scenario used to justify violence but rather to choose the course which would result in the highest probability that the dreaded scenario will actually occur. The only logical explanation is that the policies do not exist for the claimed purpose of preventing violence but rather as a means to that very end.

The more threatened Iran feels by the U.S. and Israel, the more likely it will be that Iran’s leaders truly to begin to feel that they require a nuclear deterrent to outside aggression. Iran is bordered by a nuclear-armed neighbor, Pakistan, which is likewise bordered by a nuclear India. Nuclear-armed U.S. and Israel have openly threatened violence against Iran. The more the U.S. and other Western nations continue to teach Iran the lesson that it’s in their best interests to withdraw from the NPT treaty, the more likely it will be that Iran does so. Neither Israel nor Pakistan is party to the NPT treaty, yet the Bush administration lifted sanctions on Pakistan, offered “aid”, and made it an ostensible “ally” in the so-called “war on terrorism”. While threatening sanctions and even violence against Iran for not being able to prove that its nuclear program is not intended for military purposes, Israel, which has long had a nuclear arsenal and which has long been in defiance of numerous Security Council resolutions, is rewarded with significant financial and military support. The lesson is that Iran is being punished for being a member of the NPT treaty, so the only natural and logical course of action for Iran will be to withdraw from the treaty, which would in turn mean the end of oversight and scrutiny of Iran’s nuclear program. This end result of present policies would then be used to ex post facto justify the execution of those same policies to begin with, just as occurred in the case of Iraq.

As with Iraq, the issue is not about weapons of mass destruction or failed obligations under existing treaties, but about ensuring U.S. credibility in its pursuit of global hegemony. There is one rule, which is that the U.S. makes the rules, which the U.S. will enforce under threat of violence. As was the case with Iraq, adherence to international law is not a purpose the present policy towards Iran is intended to ensure, but rather an obstacle to be overcome in its implementation. And as the invasion of Iraq has proved, as predicted, to be catastrophic not only in terms of the human consequences, but in strategic terms as well, so will any violence against Iran have considerable and well recognized catastrophic consequences. The tragic consequences of our present course of action are predictable. They are also avoidable, but only if we discard the existing framework for discussion and adopt a framework more conducive to reason and to achieving the stated policy objective of ensuring peace and stability in the world.

[1] “The riddle of Iran”, The Economist, July 21-27, 2007

[2] Dafna Linzer, “Iran Is Judged 10 Years From Nuclear Bomb”, The Washington Post, August 2, 2005; A01

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/08/01/AR2005080101453_pf.html

[3] Dr. John Chipman, “Iran’s Strategic Weapons Programmes”, International Institute for Strategic Studies (Press Statement), September 6, 2005

http://www.iiss.org/publications/strategic-dossiers/irans-strategic-weapons-programmes

Sarah Buckley and Paul Rincon, “Iran’ years from nuclear bomb’”, BBC, January 12, 2006

http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/4606356.stm

[4] “No Evidence Iran Diverted Nuclear Materials: IAEA”, UN Radio, November 15, 2004

http://www.un.org/radio/story.asp?NewsID=888

John Diamond, “U.S. intelligence agencies say Iran is years away from building nukes”, USA Today, April 13, 2006

http://www.usatoday.com/news/washington/2006-04-14-iran-nukes_x.htm

 1  |  2  |  3  |  4