KWIATKOWSKI: The great promise of the internet may be that it brings us back to the future, so to speak. In the 1700s, de Toqueville was amazed with our American obsession with information, our abundance of little newspapers, everyone a reporter, everyone with an opinion to share, and many interested parties reading and debating these opinions and observations. This energy struck him as uniquely American, and today, this energy is global, and it is embodied in the internet, in the blogosphere specifically. The blogosphere is that rough, raw and personal reporting, complete with elements of gossip and imagination. Mainstream media is establishment media, the kings' notices to the serfs. I think Allison's investigation into how well or how poorly the truth was reported in the run-up to Iraq, within the blogosphere and by the mainstream media, is not only important, but points us into a new place that may in fact lead us to fewer wars rather than more wars. After Iran, that is….
SWANSON: What is the Iran Directorate?
KWIATKOWSKI: I have heard that it is much like what we knew as the expanded Iraq desk, the alternative nomenclature for the Office of Special Plans directed by Abe Shulsky in 2002 and 2003. Incidentally – the OSP, when formally separated from our spaces in late August 2002 was described to us by our boss Bill Luti (now at the National Security Council under Elliot Abrams) as the "expanded Iraq desk." However, within weeks, the two people working the Iran desk (Larry Franklin and Ladan Archin) were moved permanently into the OSP, indicating that in practical terms, Iraq and Iran policies were unified. I have heard Abe Shulsky runs the Iran office or Directorate today. Ladan Archin, a political appointee who worked with former Iran desk officer Larry Franklin, is reported to be working for Shulsky in the same capacity as she did in OSP in 2002. When observers note the similarities between the thoroughly discredited OSP and today's Iran Directorate under Shulsky, in terms of leadership, leakage of falsehoods and talking points designed to demonize Iran's government, and promote ideas of a Iranian threat to the United States, the "need" for the U.S. to foment "democracy" in Iran, and a warmongering agenda, they are on track. It's a real shame.
SWANSON: How does intelligence gathering on Iran compare to that on Iraq?
KWIATKOWSKI: This I don't know. Judging from what is coming out of the Pentagon, there may be some good news. Peter Pace, as well as many other active duty generals, seem to be trying to put the brakes on the hysterics coming from the political side of the Pentagon. They seem to be saying go slow, and seem to be somewhat willing to contradict the propaganda, to stray from the political appointed talking points that demand urgent war and destruction of Iran's current government, and its infrastructure. However, this hesitance on the part of military leadership may be overridden by the nature of our intelligence on Iran. In Iraq, we were great in technical intelligence, having bombed, overflew, tested defenses and sanctioned Iraq for a dozen years. But we had no reliable intel on the human side, and the politicized fantasies of Wolfowitz, Feith and Chalabi and others filled a gap that the CIA had little solid HUMINT to combat. Iran, on the other hand, is not a dictatorship, and it is a place we and the Europeans trade and do business. It is a country known for working with Israel and ourselves when it is profitable to do so (Iran-Contra, efforts to weaken Saddam Hussein in the 1980s and 1990s, and our own efforts supporting the Iranian terrorist group MEK to weaken the mullahs). Thus we have lots of HUMINT on Iran – and so we think that means we know something. But our HUMINT is incomplete, heavily skewed to those we deal with – the westernized, the religious wackos in the MEK, and political opportunist elements within Iran. What I am saying is we may know a lot less about Iran than we did about Iraq in 2002 – but we may be deluded on both the CIA side and the political fantasy side into thinking we understand Iran better, and hence won't repeat the mistake we made in deciding to invade Iraq.
SWANSON: If White House claims on Iranian nuclear program were true, would they be grounds for war?
KWIATKOWSKI: Most of the world understands that the White House is making false statements on Iran's capabilities and intentions. But even if those claims were true, our own track record is not only to not bomb or invade a country that is developing a potential for a nuclear weapon, but to assist them in proceeding openly and as safely as possible. Pakistan, India, even North Korea and our recent moves of assistance – this is how we usually react. There is only one country that we do not demand sign the NPT, only one country where we do not require transparency in their nuclear programs. That country is Israel. Thus – we have two functional models for dealing with Iran. We can treat them like we do Pakistan, India, Russia, China. North Korea, or France, or we can treat them like we do Israel. Either way is fine with me, and neither way requires attacking them and killing innocent people.
SWANSON: If White House claims on Iranian assistance in Iraq were true, would they be grounds for war?
KWIATKOWSKI: If their claims were true, and we had a declaration of war with Iraq, then possibly we could say we must extend the war. But remember, we are not "at war" with Iraq. We are ostensibly in Iraq to help them be a democracy, to allow them to become wealthy and healthy and wise on the sale of their own oil, to make them a model country in the region. Isn't that how the administration likes to put it? We are not "at war" in Iraq. Our forces and bases in Iraq are also not there legally, we have no officially sanctioned Status of Forces Agreement, no independent legitimate government in Iraq that has invited our forces in, and that freely hosts our forces. For these reasons as well, it is unlikely that we can claim to legally extend violence to Iran because of what happens in Iraq.
SWANSON: When did you learn of Iranian offers to negotiate that were rejected by the Bush Administration?
KWIATKOWSKI: I read about them when they were made public. That these outreach efforts (much like letters from Ahmadinejad never being read by the President) fall on rocky ground doesn't do much for our reputation or our public claims of goodwill to the Iranian people. It also indicates the powerful grip of the neoconservatives in the Pentagon and the NSC, and the power of the Vice President's own staff, to shape our foreign policy without any primary concern for what is good for the United States.
SWANSON: Do you believe the Air Force and Navy want to attack Iran, while the Army and Marines do not?
KWIATKOWSKI: I do, but I'd be delighted to be shown to be wrong here. My opinion is based on my twenty years in the Air Force, and how we are in the military. It is a big game, and there is indeed competition between the services. For budget and for glory. Plus, we can't buy new stuff unless we test and use up the old and current stuff. Everyone wins in the military industrial complex by pressing forward aggressively. So yes, I believe the Air Force and Navy are working hard to please the administration's desire to trample Arab and Persian countries by saying "We can do it!"
SWANSON: Do you believe sentiment either way from within the military is likely to have a large effect on what happens?
KWIATKOWSKI: If the Air Force and Navy leadership stood up, sided with the Army and Marines, and said to the President, the media and the Congress that they are finished with this stupid Middle East policy, and they all quit on the spot, an attack on Iran would not happen under the Bush administration. But if only the Army and Marine Corps leadership pushes back, the subsequent power and credibility vacuum is easily filled by Air Force and Naval leadership. We already have seen this with the new Central Command Combatant Commander, Admiral Fallon. One may say that it was the Navy's turn to have the Central Command position, but it happened only after General Abizaid, one of our most region-aware and knowledgeable leaders, began to tell the truth publicly about our situation in Iraq. So the answer is – yes, it could in theory, but it won't in fact.
SWANSON: Reps. Kucinich and Conyers have suggested they would impeach Bush if he attacks Iran. Good idea? What about impeaching first to prevent it?
KWIATKOWSKI: Great idea. Impeach early and often. That's my advice. It can be done by the House so easily, for so little. Most senior members of the administration involved in our disastrous foreign policy and our incredibly stupid approach to fighting terrorism could be easily impeached for incompetence, wrongdoing, dishonesty, failure to honor the spirit and letter of the constitution and other laws, even in my view, traitorous acts, placing the interests of foreign countries above those of the United States. Some of these impeached officials would be easily removed from office by the Senate, and we would regain our honor as a nation by publicly recognizing their misbehavior.
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