Another unanswered question about the proposed arms deal is: Why now?

Had the administration moved before November 2003, the announcement would have been seen in the region as an audacious – given the “success” of U.S.-led coalitions in Afghanistan and Iraq – but credible recommitment by Washington to the then 25 year-old policy of diplomatic, economic, and military (conventional and nuclear) containment of Tehran’s ambitions in the Gulf.

But looking at the Saudi record and Riyadh’s increasing propensity to act in its interests without coordinating with Washington, there is the suggestion that the Bush administration is suddenly wary of its “other” flank in the Persian Gulf – the one occupied by the Saudi-dominated six-member Gulf Cooperation Council.

Militarily overcommitted in mid-summer 2007, the White House has only two cards to play: pump up fear of Iran acquiring enough enriched uranium to build a nuclear weapon, or bribe the regional allies. For a few months the nuclear fear factor seemed to work, but Tehran seems to have become “reasonable” enough in its position to defuse tensions with most of the main actors in this dispute.

This left the Bush administration with bribery, spiced with a touch of traditional Sunni-Shi’a sectarianism that underpins relations between Riyadh and Tehran even when they cooperate (e.g., the just-formed Iraq security sub-committee).So this week the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense are on an old-fashion, bribe-them-first-then-twist-arms, whistle-stop campaign to make sure regional “allies” – this time including the Saudis – are in line behind U.S. policy.

But the multi-billion dollar arms deal has some inconsistencies that could cause the two secretaries problems. The most immediate one is the policy message represented by the sheer size of the arms deal. Washington has been insisting that there is no military solution to the region’s trauma. Yet it is proposing $63 billion for weapons that will, if used, only increase trauma.And that total apparently doesn’t include $40 million  in guns, bullets, rockets, missiles, small arms ammunition, night vision goggles, and spare parts for the Lebanese army this year and another $280 million for 2008. Nor does it include the $3 billion Iraq is spending on weapons and ammunition.

The sale, once Congress is formally notified, will go through unless Congress acts to block it. The Israelis say this time they have no objection – Prime Minister Olmert and the Israel Defense Forces  see Tehran as a greater threat than Riyadh. As for the Pentagon, it hopes that the increased production of some items will save it money through economy of scale. And of course U.S. companies that build weapons and munitions are pleased at the prospect of new contracts and new profits.

But what this proposal doesn’t  explain – unless it’s somewhere in the fine print that hasn’t yet come to light – is how pouring more weapons into the Middle East moves the region in general and Iraq in particular any closer to resolving the underlying political impasse.  George Bush started the Iraq war over weapons that never existed. It’s ironic that his administration seems to now think the way to end the war is to make sure there are more weapons. Go figure!

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Subsequent intelligence and public affairs assignments were at Fort Hood, Texas; the Army Materiel Research and Development Command, where he was speechwriter for the Commanding General; the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA); and Headquarters, Department of the Army.  Six of his years with DIA were in London in the British Ministry of Defense and n as Military Attache in the U.S. Embassy. Colonel Smith retired in 1992. He joined the non-partisan Center for Defense Information in April 1993 becoming Associate Director in 1995 and Chief of Research in 1999.

Colonel Smith, a graduate of the Army Command and General Staff College, the Armed Forces Staff College, and the Army War College, joined the Friends Committee on National Legislation in September 2002 as Senior Fellow on Military Affairs.