A Problem with Puppet Governments: Phantom Armies

There is a well know and ancient problem with puppet governments: they often field Phantom Armies. When an imperial power pays to raise local armies, the requisite payroll and arms create an irresistible temptation for local commanders. The more troops reportedly equipped and fielded, the greater the local commander's payroll and arms store. And the greater the local commander's force, the greater the "success" of the imperial army's advisors in the eyes of the imperial government paying the bills. If a soldier does not exist, his pay goes into the pockets of the local command structure and his weapon onto the black market or into a militia armory; or, if the fighter exists, a portion may go to the faction that fielded the soldier, whose loyalty the faction retains. The imperial military's own rank and file's doubts about the puppet government's army are suppressed in the interests of reporting success. Soon the imperial headquarters' maps begin to show whole units whose actual size and capability are a fraction of their nominal strength and tactical value, if they exist at all. And, if those forces do exist, then their lack of loyalty or reliability make them potentially worst than useless.

In Iraq, General Petraeus, a particularly political general, has been arming, willy nilly, any faction prepared to pretend to be part of US led coalition or at least appear to serve its interests. So, for example, Sunni "terrorists" have been transformed into ad hoc militia forces, such as "Awakening" movement, and have been hailed by the Bush administration as evidence of Petraeus' genius. A reduction in attacks on US forces, as they hand out weapons and funds, is pointed to as proof of the coalition's success. However, this is the military version of cooked corporation books, wherein both long term strategic interests and near term tactical coherence are sacrificed for the illusion of success in the next quarterly report. The essential difficulty here is those factions eventually begin to act as the independent agents they are, especially when asked to disarm, or to deploy any distance from home, or to join the puppet government's army, or to attack parties with whom they are allied or with whom they have no quarrel. Further, under the press of circumstance and ever shifting alliances of Iraq's tribal society, these factions, once armed by the US military, can then turn on each other and their US benefactors. In short, all progress in paying for and arming factions actually results an illusionary calm. In the case of Iraq, the tribal militias are very real and completely unreliable US coalition partners, while the puppet government's army is largely a phantom, except for special units whose behavior is indistinguishable from other factions. Whatever Iraqi forces being fielded by General Petraeus are, they are not a national army answerable to our puppet government.

And therein lies the core weakness of US Iraq War plans. Those thousands of Iraqi police and troops, which we claim to have fielded in reports of success to the president and Congress, and via the media to the American people and our allies, are not only not a useful force, but represent a serious risk to US forces. In fact, the utility of the so-called Surge itself was in part to insulate local Iraqi forces from actual war fighting responsibility, supposedly giving them needed time to train and to prepare to "take up the burden," but in fact to delay the day of reckoning. And all is well, until such units confront an enemy who shoots back, as happened in Basra, whereupon Iraqi government forces "melted" away or turned on US and Iraqi government forces as the enemy.

And so the much heralded Basra offensive, of which Bush said, "[A]s we speak, Iraqi security forces are waging a tough battle against militia fighters and criminals in Basra—many of whom have received arms and training and funding from Iran," went belly up. Just days after issuing a surrender ultimatum to the Mahdi Army, a reported Iraqi government police and military force of 30,000 melted away in the face of determined resistance from neighborhood militias with no heavy weapons. This despite Iraqi government tanks, US air support, British artillery support, and reportedly US special forces units acting as a bracing force. According to a report in the New York Times, "The [British] defense secretary, Desmond Browne, also used his statement in the House of Commons to acknowledge that British military involvement in last week’s fighting in Basra was more extensive than previously disclosed. At one point, he said, British tanks, armored vehicles, artillery and ground troops were deployed to help extract Iraqi government troops from a firefight with Shiite militiamen in the city. Mr. Browne said British involvement in that battle was in addition to other actions in support of Iraqi forces. He said those actions included aerial surveillance of the city; low-level missions by combat aircraft aimed at reinforcing Iraqi troops by establishing a menacing aerial presence over combat zones; the use of helicopters that carried food and ammunition to the Iraqis; and medical care for wounded Iraqi troops at British combat hospitals outside the city. Mr. Browne said the use of British ground troops in the fighting was ordered 'in extremis', suggesting that the deployment of forces from the British base at Basra was a last-ditch measure to save Iraqi troops." In other words, the Basra offensive was a complete failure, called a "setback" in the success-speak of the US command in Iraq and Republicans in Washington.

In a final theatrical absurdity, the Iraqi government announced many of these "troops," likely payroll phantoms, were to be charged with desertion, thereby hoping to assuage a reportedly stunned Bush White House, where Bush stumbled into an ambush of his own, when, in a rare appearance before an unvetted audience, Bush was roundly booed by many of the 41,000 fans as he threw out the first pitch for the opening season game at the new Nationals Park.

The US broke the six month cease-fire being observed by the Mahdi Army because the cease-fire did not serve US interests, so the respite after the failed Basra offensive is likely to be brief, used to continue to build up Iraqi forces in Basra, to renew soon efforts to place the Mahdi Army in Basra back under siege and otherwise prepare to deal with the expected response to attacks on Iran. The siege against the Mahdi Army in Baghdad is likely to intensify, using US troops, in the hopes of quickly creating a offsetting success.

All this illusionary success presents an insurmountable obstacle to even talking about withdrawal, because once the possible end to the arms and funds appears on the event horizon, various factions in and out of the US coalition will begin to maneuver, positioning themselves to deal with the pending new reality and abandoning the pretense that sustains the current situation. Just as they did when the British left Basra to the Iraqis, which the Basra offensive was designed to fix as well as to cover the US flank in the Iran attacks. Within this context, Bush must decide: Should he try to hang on until the next president takes command of this pending disaster, risking a "Tet" like offensive in the fall before US elections that would manifestly demonstrate Bush's failure; or, should Bush double-down on the Iraq gamble by attacking Iran, which would then be blamed for US "setbacks." It appears likely the US will leave Iraq the way it entered: accompanied by in a blizzard of lies.

Saudi Nuclear Concerns

Saudi Arabia's Shura council, a high level leadership advisory board, is considering the issue of nuclear radiation from the US bombing Iran's nuclear facilities. What is most concerning about this development is the timing: vice-president Cheney visited the Saudis one day, and the next day "it was revealed that the Saudi Shura Council -- the elite group that implements the decisions of the autocratic inner circle -- is preparing "national plans to deal with any sudden nuclear and radioactive hazards that may affect the kingdom following experts' warnings of possible attacks on Iran's Bushehr nuclear reactors," one of the kingdom's leading newspapers, Okaz, reports. The German-based DPA news service relayed the paper's story, according to Chris Floyd's blog Empire Burlesque. The Bush administration, as well as the rest of the world, should also note that no major story, especially one this sensitive and in a leading paper, appears without the Saudi government's approval, indicating Bush has fewer friends in the Middle-East after the Bush-Cheney visits to the region than before. Bush might find it useful if Rice reviewed with Bush the State Department's own appraisal of Cheney's visit, in case Cheney's own account needed clarification or fleshing out.

Nuclear Weapon Use

Another source of concern, besides whatever Dick Cheney whispered in Saudi ears during his visit, Bush has repeatedly and pointedly refused to rule out nuclear weapons use with regard to Iran. So presumably, at some point in the likely escalating exchanges between the US and Iran, Bush would be open to using nuclear weapons against Iran, perhaps even in the opening attack on large underground facilities. Or in retaliation for a catastrophic naval losses, such as an aircraft carrier lost to Iranian missile attacks.

US Naval Deployments

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