New UN Sanctions Make US-Iran War More Likely

While the actual course of events is unknown and present many alternative possibilities, circumstances suggest one probable sequence of events:

1. One or more naval incidents in which US warships halt the passage of Iranian flag vessels near Iranian territorial waters, provoking some response from these or other Iranian vessels;

2. This in turn permits the US government to characterize these events as hostile acts of war against US enforcement of a Security Council resolution, ordering the US military to react to alleged Iranian actions, promptly escalating from in locus to theater-wide attacks on Iranian naval assets at sea;

3. These are followed, whether there is a significant Iranian response or not, by operations directed at Iranian naval bases;

4. The relatively small US attacking forces directed toward the naval bases are defended by a far larger force that conducts wide-ranging attacks on Iran’s air defense systems;

5. This then creates an event platform from which long planned operations against Iranian industrial and nuclear facilities would be undertaken.

Gravest Consequences

    Should this or equivalent events occur, the potential for destabilizing US domestic and international consequences of extreme gravity would be substantial, approaching near certainty. This nominally unattractive and reckless gamble for unclear objectives would fit Bush's pattern of governance, whereby poorly planned and managed military operations are undertaken in pursuit of a mostly secret agenda, justified by a series of ever changing public rationales. Given the risks, it is unlikely war with Iran would be undertaken just for a chance to create conditions in the Middle East that lock in future policy options, as he has in domestic policy with a massive deficit. Instead, given the stakes, Bush would be expected to attack not only his foreign enemies, but at the same time strike at his domestic foes under the cover of the resulting emergency.  

    The more significant Iran's response or the more disruptive the economic and political consequences, the more likely it would be combined with or be followed by a formal declaration by Bush of a national emergency, possibly affecting US national elections, resulting in a de facto coup d'état and the most serious destabilization of the United States since the civil war. While these risks would normally result in swift dismissal of such a plan of action, unfortunately such an attack on Iran would be consistent with Bush's history of striking out at those who impede or criticize him  as well as his willingness to take radical actions because of an apparent failure to appreciate the institutional and systemic costs involved.    

Backing Away from the Brink

    Finally, this is admittedly an extreme assessment. However, given Bush wants to attack Iran and does, these appear to be the likely consequences. To further assess their likelihood, ask the question: If Bush wants to attack Iran, who is to stop him? Not the United States Congress; not the United Nations; not the courts; not pubic opinion, nor the press. The one chance, however slight, of stopping Bush would rest almost entirely with the British government, if Parliament became aware of the plan and renounced it prior to the commencement of hostilities.

    While nothing can be done to prevent a completely fabricated incident, clearly Iran would be expected to reduce the threat of attacks upon itself by the following: