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By Andrew Mills (about the author) Page 2 of 4 page(s)
10. The Able Danger program of the Special Operations Command of the Department of Defense used "data-mining" techniques well before 9/11 that reportedly identified several of the 19 hijackers, including Mohammed Atta. This program appears to have been shut down in May 2001, presumably because it had conducted illegal surveillance on U.S. citizens, but according to media reports, Able Danger used all open-source data (public information) to identify its targets. Further, the hijackers identified were not U.S. citizens and therefore were not entitled to the same rights and protections as Americans. Reportedly the Able Danger files containing all the garnered evidence about al Qaeda sleeper cells inside the U.S. were permanently destroyed in May 2001. Why were they not shared with other intelligence agencies such as the FBI? More disturbing, the identified sleeper cells were left alone to carry out their final plans and preparations.
11. The New York Times on April 15, 2004 reported that in August 2001 CIA Director George Tenet and his deputies at the CIA were presented with a briefing paper labeled "Islamic Extremist Learns to Fly" about the arrest days earlier of Zacarias Moussaoui, but the CIA did not act on the information
12. Intelligence agency heads described themselves as having their "hair on fire" to characterize the imminent nature of the threats they were intercepting from al Qaeda and their sense of urgency in relating them to the Bush Administration
13. Aside from scheduling a National Security Council meeting on September 4, 2001, two months after the July 10 "connect-the-dots" briefing from CIA director George Tenet, the abundance of post 9/11 reports and commissions found no evidence of any action taken by appropriate officials. The 9/11 Commission itself concluded that in spite of an unprecedented attack threat in the months before 9/11, US "domestic agencies never mobilized in response to the threat. They did not have direction, and did not have a plan to institute. The borders were not hardened. Transportation systems were not fortified. Electronic surveillance was not targeted against a domestic threat. State and local law enforcement were not marshaled to augment the FBI's efforts. The public was not warned."
Failures by Officials On and Before 9/11 to Keep Us Safe
1. On May 8, 2001, President Bush appointed Vice President Cheney to head the new Office of National Preparedness, which involved overseeing a 'national effort' to coordinate all federal programs designed to respond to domestic terror attacks. It appears that Cheney totally failed in his duty, particularly in August 2001, when as former CIA Director George Tenet said, "The system was blinking red."
2. National Security Advisor, Condoleezza Rice, failed to act on any of the many warnings she received about an imminent attack by al Qaeda.
3. President Bush failed to assume a leadership role on 9/11: (1) His failure to even ask Andrew Card his Chief of Staff at the Emma E. Booker Elementary School for any details when the latter told him about the crash of United 175; (2) His failure to insist on heading back to Washington to take command of the situation; and (3) His failure to devise a plan to implement that day.
4. General Richard Myers, the acting Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff said that when he heard about the first crash he thought it was an accident, so he went into a meeting with Senator Max Cleland. He said he only heard about the second crash (which occurred at 9:03 am) upon leaving the meeting just a few minutes before the Pentagon was hit at 9:37 am.
5. Donald Rumsfeld was sought for an hour by the Pentagon command center and first appeared there at around 10:30 am, according to The 9/11 Commission Report.
6. General Montague Winfield, head of the National Military Command Center at the Pentagon arranged on the evening of Sept. 10th to be replaced on his scheduled shift the next morning for the two hours starting at 8:30 am by his inexperienced deputy, Captain Charles Leidig (since promoted to admiral).
7. The US military in Afghanistan reportedly had several opportunities to capture Osama bin Laden, but the troops on the ground were apparently told not to do so.
Attempts by Government Officials to Cover Up Evidence Concerning 9/11
1. The Administration mounted major resistance to the formation of the 9/11 Commission, but eventually had to yield due to pressure from 9/11 victims' families. From the outset, Vice President Cheney offered the greatest resistance to the Family Steering Committee's attempt to form an independent commission. According to Kristen Breitweiser in her book, Wake-Up Call The Political Education of a 9/11 Widow, Cheney would call up congressional officials and threaten them, stating flatly that there would be no 9/11 independent commission. He placed many phone calls threatening the loss of party support for a re-election campaign, a chairmanship of a prized committee, or administration support for a pet project. Publicly, he would state that the White House was opposed to any independent-style 9/11 commission because we were a nation at war and could not spare the resources.
2. Soon after Congress passed legislation authorizing creation of the 9/11 Commission, the White House insisted on naming the chairman of the Commission and having control over the Commission's subpoena power. They opposed keeping the Commission completely independent and bipartisan. Eventually they had to give up on controlling subpoenas, but they still were able to appoint the Chairman of the Commission while the Democrats were permitted to appoint the Vice Chairman.
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