Current voting system software disclosure provisions in federally proposed legislation need to be rewritten, perhaps in separate legislation, in consultation with experts with diverse technical backgrounds.
It might be wiser to pass simpler legislation requiring sufficient manual audits and public access to election records that are necessary to verify election outcomes that could be implemented by 2008, and put any requirements for long-term improvement of voting equipment that require time for development cycles, into a separate bill.
It is very important for Congressional staffers who are considering election integrity legislation to know that we need a clean election bill that would ensure accurate election outcomes by 2008, plus realistic measures to achieve better voting systems long-term - not another HAVA mess.
Congressional staffers are also urged to read this evaluation of the Holt/Nelson election audits, which shows how the Holt/Nelson election audit could be revised to assure that election audits protect all US House districts, even in close races.
"Fool Me Once: Checking Vote Count Integrity" http://electionarchive.org/ucvAnalysis/US/paper-audits/TierElectionAuditEval.pdf
and a list of some of the loopholes and flaws of HR811/S559 that would need to be fixed: http://electionarchive.org/ucvInfo/US/ChangesNeeded2HR811.pdf
Thank you very much.
Sincerely, YOUR NAME
EndNote:
[ii] Optical scan voting systems with voter-verified paper ballots protect ballot privacy, unlike e-ballot DREs with paper rolls. Optical scan voting system software cannot subvert manual audits via software hacks that wrongly alter post-facto voter-verifiable paper records, unlike DREs. Optical scan voting systems use durable, archival weight paper ballots that are good for audits, unlike DREs with paper rolls. Optical scan voting systems are less expensive to operate and maintain than DREs with paper rolls. Federal funds should never fund systems with invisible electronic ballots that able-bodied voters cannot verify directly, such as DREs.
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