OpEdNews - Page 2 of Article: Critical security alert: Three-level security flaws found in Diebold touch-screens

Here is a rough analogy:

- The application can be imagined as written instructions on a paper.
If it is possible to replace these instructions, as it indeed seems,
then the attacker can do whatever he wishes as long as the
instructions are used.

- The operating system is the man reading the instructions. If he can
be brainwashed according to the wishes of the attacker, then even
correct instructions on the paper solve nothing. The man can decide to
selectively do something different than the instructions. New paper
instructions come and go, and the attacker can decide which
instructions to follow because the operating system itself is under
his control.

- The boot loader is the supreme entity that creates the man, the
world and everything in it. In addition to creating, the boot loader
also defines what is allowed in the world and delegates part of that
responsibility to the operating system. If the attacker can replace
the boot loader, trying to change the paper instructions or the man
reading them does not work. The supreme entity will always have the
power to replace the man with his own favorite, or perhaps he just
modifies the man 's eyes and ears: Every time the man sees yellow, the
supreme being makes him think he is seeing brown. The supreme entity
can give the man two heads and a secret magic word to trigger
switching the heads.

In the world of the Diebold touch-screen voting terminals, all of
these attacks look possible.

The instructions (applications and files) can be changed. The man
reading the files (Windows CE Operating System and the libraries) can
be changed. Or the supreme entity (boot loader) can be changed, giving
total control over the operating system and the files even if they are
"clean software."

Specific conceptual information is contained in the report, with
details and filenames in the high-security version which is being
delivered under cryptographic and/or personal signature controls to
the EAC, Diebold CEO Tom Swidarski and CERT.

1) Boot loader reflashing
2) Operating system reflashing
3) Selective file replacement

In addition, the casing of the TSx machines lack basic seals and
security, and within the casing additional exploitations are found.

Conclusions and Recommendations

Because there is no way of having chain of custody or audit trail for
machines, the machines need to be reflashed with a known good version
(assessing the risks potentially inherited). Ideally this should be
done by the proper governmental authorities rather than being
outsourced.

After that, extensive chain of custody management has to be
established to make sure that machines do not potentially get
recontaminated. Less than five minutes is required for contamination.

The bootloader needs to be re-engineered.

The cases need to be properly and permanently sealed.

Further study is warranted around these issues and others in the May
15, 2006 Supplemental Report for the Emery County TSx study.

While these flaws in design are not in the vote-processing system
itself, they potentially seriously compromise election security. It
would be helpful to learn how existing oversight processes have failed
to identify this threat.

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