New York Times has quoted American military officials as saying that if adopted, the proposal would join elements of a shift in strategy that would also be likely to expand the presence of American military trainers in Pakistan, directly finance a separate tribal paramilitary force that until now has proved largely ineffective and pay militias that agreed to fight Al Qaeda and foreign extremists.
The proposal is modeled in part on a similar effort by American forces in Anbar Province of Iraq where American commanders have worked with Sunni sheiks to turn locals against the militant group. This has been hailed as a great success in fighting insurgents there. But it raises the question of whether such partnerships, to be forged in this case by Pakistani troops backed by the United States, can be made without a significant American military presence in Pakistan. And it is unclear whether enough support can be found among the tribes.
Many experts point out that the experiment as it played-out in Iraq had produced disastrous results in El Salvador where it further polarized the populace and turned the people against the US efforts. But, in Iraq, the policy was judged successful by the Bush administration because of the unexpected bonus of inciting religious sectarian civil warfare. It is not clear what will be the consequences of the Anbar model in the volatile Federally Administered Area (FATA) of Pakistan where even national army is seen as an occupying army by many fiercely independent-mind tribesmen.
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