If Beirut delegates its decisions on peace and other issues to regional players, then Lebanon’s fate depends on regional outcome. Yet this time, America will keep on shielding Lebanon from possible regional trades for reasons that are more ethical than pragmatic.
At the same time, Washington feels compelled to sort out other regional issues with Damascus: Enter engagement.
While anti-Syrian Lebanese believe engagement spells a definitive deal over their heads, and while Syria boasts with confidence, as it receives US delegations, that a deal over Lebanon and its tribunal are certainly near, a number of US diplomats believe engaging Damascus is more complicated.
Washington’s plans to engage Damascus have nothing to do with Lebanon. Talking to Syria is rather tied to detaching Syria from the Iranian axis in the region, and/or arriving at a peace deal between Damascus and Tel Aviv.
In either case, the Syrian regional behavior is expected to change drastically, a condition which the Bush administration had put as its goal to end Syria’s isolation.
Should Syria detach from Iran, it will find itself at odds with Hezbollah and Hamas and on the same side with Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Jordan and the March 14 coalition. If that happens, a deal compromising Lebanon’s independence and the pro-independence forces becomes obsolete.
Should Syria ink a peace deal with Israel, Tel Aviv would expect Syrian cooperation in fighting anti-Israel groups such as Hamas and Hezbollah, which will again put Syria at odds with its current allies and make a deal over Lebanon possible, pending improbable American approval, and Syria’s ability to disarm Hezbollah, which few believe Syria can offer or do.
Unlike in 1991, when Israeli-Syrian talks were over the Golan Heights, this time any such talks will focus on disarming Hezbollah, with the Golan as a prize for such a deal.
The above offers to Syria, through engagement, remain theoretical, and until US diplomats figure out how these can be transformed into viable options that include reversal of offers, or sticks in diplomatic jargon, there will be no engagement between the two countries.
And should Washington feel Syria cannot deliver on its promises, as has happened with the French, then the US looks bound to talk to Syria’s boss, in this case Iran, which is also part of Obama’s promises of engagement, unlike in 1991.
Syria might cheer for Obama’s announcement of engagement, but Syria must keep in mind that the offer includes Iran too, and where Syria fails to deliver, Washington might skip and move on to the higher bidder, in this case Tehran, and either leave Damascus out in the cold, or strike a deal with the Iranian regime, over the head of the Syrian regime, Hamas, and Hezbollah.
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