How then should the West navigate this minefield of political and cultural passions? For now it seems to be taking the side of the political opposition or, more precisely, its most moderate representative, Vitaly Klitschko. The hope seems to be that he can convince moderate street protesters not to support the nationalists in their efforts to topple the parliamentary system, even though he has been unsuccessful at this in the past.
The most generous interpretation of Western aims is that, by clearly backing one side in this conflict, it hopes to undermine the radicals and give Klitschko the political momentum he needs to forge a government of national unity. Once such a government is in place, the EU and United States have hinted that a "new Marshall Plan" might be made available for Ukraine.
The problem with this approach is that the message of national unity, as the outcome the West would like to see, is not having much impact on the political opposition. They still see the government as their main enemy, rather than as a partner they need to reign in the nationalists and restore law and order. Moreover, Klitschko is on record as saying that "under no circumstances" will he consider working alongside the current president. Along with the other leaders of the parliamentary political opposition, he continues to regard the nationalists as an undesirable, but necessary, instrument for gaining political power.
Rather than trying to pick a "winner" out of the murky waters of Ukrainian politics, a better strategy would be to support the conciliation process itself, and to make any financial and political support contingent on that process being underway.
Under normal circumstances, parliament itself would be the body to initiate such a process, guided by the constitution. But since the work of parliament is often sabotaged by the opposition, which also questions the legitimacy of the current constitution, it might be appropriate to consider holding an extraordinary constitutional convention to work out a new public compact, and establish a timetable for its implementation. Something akin to a zemsky sobor (Council of the Whole Land), a familiar concept in both Ukrainian and Russian history. The delegates would have to be respected public figures, representative of every region of the country, every walk of life and confession, delegated by their respective communities.
Such a conciliation process could be further helped by unconditional, a priori international support for whatever it agrees to. This point is vital to convince average Ukrainians that the decisions resulting from such a gathering are indeed the independent choice of the entire Ukrainian people, and not just the victory of one faction, inevitably "backed by outside forces," over another. Only support offered jointly by the E.U. and Russia (or CIS) cannot be so easily dismissed, and it is noteworthy that such an approach, also including the United States, was recently suggested by the board of the influential Yalta European Strategy.
But even after the current political crisis is resolved, the deep-seated fears undermining the quest for a common Ukrainian identity will linger. They too must be addressed. Until the fear that Western Ukrainians have of losing their language and culture subsides, many people there will regard tolerance of Russian cultural influence not as a compromise, but as surrender. By the same token, Western Ukrainians need to recognize that attempts to eradicate Russian cultural influence stoke similar fears in the East and South. A solution that has worked well for countries as diverse as Spain, Belgium, and Canada, is to embrace the concept of multiple cultural identities coexisting within one national identity.
In practical terms this would mean giving up on twenty years of imposing the use of Ukrainian in schools and in the media, which contributes directly to the political gridlock by translating the defense of "our culture" in the East and South into political support for any politician, no matter how unsavory, who promises the people that they will be allowed to use the language of their choice.
The next logical step would be to move bilingualism from the regional level, where it only serves to foster localism, to the national level, where it can actually promote national unity. Mandating equality for both languages at the national level would affirm the rights of Eastern and Southern Ukrainians to their cultural identity, while retaining strong regional language laws would allow Western Ukrainians to promote their own culture and language.
A good model for Ukraine to ponder is Canada, where regional language laws are applied asymmetrically--most provinces are officially English-speaking but provide some services in French, the province of Quebec is officially French-speaking, but provides some services in English, and just two provinces are officially bilingual. Nevertheless, official bilingualism at the national level affords people a guarantee of equality of access and recognition to key federal services wherever they live, and is widely credited for having preserved national unity.
None of these proposals will instantly resolve the current political crisis. It is important to realize, however, that there are no institutional or political quick fixes to a problem that is, at its heart, cultural. Until the issue of national identity is resolved in a manner acceptable to both major Ukrainian cultural identities, similar political crises are bound to recur.
Due to historical circumstances, modern Ukraine is neither fully East
nor fully West. Potentially, however, it contains the best of both. At
this critical juncture it can either let the cultural divide between
Europe and Russia go right through its heart, or, it can help bring an
end to this division by healing its own cultural wounds.
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