Unless nationalism is considered a fundamental (and a characteristically exclusive, conservative) principle, isolationism is not a principled objection to international interventions. It wouldn't be principled to argue that an intervention in the internal affairs of another country is inherently wrong unless one upholds a principle that national borders are more important than thousands or millions of lives. It isn't principled to argue that it is wrong to use force to prevent a government from killing its people en masse unless governments are held to be inviolable. And what's the difference between a government abusing and murdering countless children and a parent publicly abusing a single child, except the scale and intensity? In either case, to object to outside intervention is to invoke a more-or-less implicit, exclusive principle claiming governments and parents are ultimate authorities beyond justifiable interference.
An anti-principle that claims that regardless of whether a successful international intervention might be desirable, interventions to stop mass killings can never succeed, is indefensible. Anti-principles can be refuted by simple recourse to historical examples, which even if unpersuasive to the advocates, serve to flush implicit unprincipled claims into the open. Only those who put being "right" above principle would, for example, continue to argue against the victims of ethnic cleansing in the Balkans in the 1990s that some form of effective intervention should not have been undertaken. There should be a carefully reasoned arguments that a particular intervention could only make matters worse, because there have been interventions that have led to the collapse of genocidal regimes. Cambodia. So a principled case against a particular intervention would have to show that it is prohibitively unlikely, not absolutely impossible to succeed.
Political reasons can be advanced for opposing particular interventions without rejecting the principle itself. It is arguable that the US, NATO, and the UN should not intervene in Syria because they are too corrupt to do so in a principled way. But it would require an anti-principle to argue that international interventions are inherently corrupt -- as-if the existence of corrupt police departments could justify the elimination of police authority. It would require an anti-principle to argue that any intervention anywhere could only make matters worse, and increase the killing, however principled the intention -- as-if sending police to stop a mass-murder in progress would necessarily just add to the mayhem.
The issue of practicality can be a legitimate reason for opposing an intervention. A regime may be too powerful to confront successfully, the willing participants in an intervention may be too weak. A military occupation might be out of the question given current international sentiments and mistrust of international institutions. But practical reasons for opposing an intervention should be expressed without recourse to the un- and anti-principled arguments that only distract from and undermine those that are principled and determinant.
The civil war in Syria is still raging at this time, although direct military intervention by other nations seems increasingly unlikely. Bias continues to play a major role in how the prospect of intervention there is regarded, so it's a good, concrete example to consider.
Biased arguments on principle are the most difficult to dissuade, because although they treat a situation in its particularity, they do so only insofar as to justify a desired conclusion. The argument that the US should not intervene in Syria because it only seeks to install a subservient government is valid as far as it goes, but it only goes as far as to support a bias against US foreign policy. For example, it can be agreed that US international relations are based on narrow and aggressive interests, but what if the people we would most want to support in Syria welcome US involvement because their immediate interests are survival and the overthrow of a dictator, and they are willing to risk US and other nations' designs? Consider this: What if people in France during the US Revolutionary War had successfully opposed their monarchy's support of our revolutionaries with abstract objections to war and the ulterior motives of their king? Our founders rightly accepted the risks of French domination by accepting their aid; isn't it possible that the most progressive factions in Syria are making a similar calculation? Bias denies such a possibility outright, and actually favors the Syrian dictatorship simply because of opposition to US objectives.
Another example of a biased argument, which effectively supports the Syrian dictatorship, relies on the claim that the only significant opposition to the regime consists of foreign jihadis. To claim that it is possible, there or anywhere, for foreign infiltrators to foment a civil war is manifestly unrealistic. It is no less absurd than the dismissive and unprincipled argument often heard from conservatives, that protest movements by minorities, workers, or students are illegitimate because they are actually provoked by "outside agitators." It is insulting to human dignity, and it has no place in progressive criticism.
Bias tends to fall into false principles. There is a commonly expressed claim that it would be illegal for a US President to commit troops to an international intervention without Congressional authorization, even if in compliance with a treaty obligation. But a humanitarian intervention under international law is not a war, even though it may involve shooting; they are no less different than murder and justifiable homicide. And the UN Charter is a treaty like any other; if the UN mandates that member states should intervene in a nation on humanitarian grounds, with force if necessary, the President is obliged to respond. (See Article VI of the US Constitution and Article 42 of the UN Charter at the end of this article.) Under the US Constitution the question of whether to honor a treaty is not subject to debate and denial -- it is supreme, overriding law. Congress may try to abrogate the treaty (by leaving the UN), or limit the scope and duration of an intervention by budgetary means, and citizens can object that the US is not intervening for humanitarian reasons, and/or that the UN is acting corruptly, but it is only bias or lack of clarity that would lead one to invoke the false principle of illegality.
Solutions
I've criticized several approaches to opposing forceful international intervention as un- or anti-principled, and therefore misguided, ineffective, and counter to progressive values. They are counter-productive because they obscure valid, principled reasons that might actually serve to discourage an ill-advised intervention.
How then should a principled person or political body formulate a positive policy toward intervention, to oppose those that are premature or unwarranted and support those that can be expected to arrest crimes against humanity when peaceful efforts have been exhausted?
I see two aspects to the question, depending on whether it's in consideration of a present crisis or of developing a long-term policy and procedure. Regarding an active or proposed intervention, what may be most important is the question of whether a faction exists among the victims whom we can support that welcomes it and believes it can succeed in stopping the bloodshed and creating or restoring a responsible government. (The appraisals of those directly involved should be weighed at least as heavily as our own opinions from afar -- it isn't "all about us.") Another issue to consider is whether an intervention is practical, politically and logistically. And if the US is involved in advocating an intervention, and especially if it is to be US-led, that might be a compelling reason to be in opposition, or it might only be cause for concern in view of the victims' pragmatic support for intervention; in either case, a reasoned argument for or against US participation in a humanitarian intervention, instead of an unprincipled and irrelevant opposition, can help bring the nefarious aspects of US foreign policy into sharper relief. Another consideration is the possibility that there may be contrary, overriding long-term and/or regional interests that make an intervention most regrettably counter-productive in wider and longer perspectives. (This may be the implicit belief of those who pretend progressive forces don't exist in Syria, rather than confront and express the unsavory opinion that it's more important to maintain a reliable regional bar against the US and Israel by defending an oppressive regime than it is to save lives in Syria, there-and-now.) These sorts of factors, not "no war!", or "it's none of our business!", or "it's illegal!", or "Assad is not so bad!", are the principled and more effective objections that can be raised against an unwanted intervention, or for an intervention that is considered urgent and necessary.
Looking beyond current conditions and crises, if progressive values are to prevail and innocent lives are to be saved in the future, we need to develop explicit and consistent guidelines to aid in evaluating appropriate responses to crimes against humanity as they occur. And we need to support the development of regional or world-wide institutions capable of mounting interventions.
Each humanitarian crisis can provide useful lessons for improving our analysis and effectiveness; retrospective evaluations, however unpleasant for those who argued mistaken positions, are invaluable. And instead of taking sides with one major power or another in response to a crisis, we should always strive to think strategically rather than emotionally, to use their rivalries to our advantage; if, for example, the US has an interest in deposing a brutal dictator in the orbit of Russia or China, that might provide the best chance for an effective multinational intervention, and might ultimately lead to the establishment of a more progressive regime, despite US intentions.
In the most long-term perspective, we should support the development of new multinational organizations capable of advocating and implementing humanitarian interventions. Clearly, the UN is unreliable in this role, given the priority afforded national sovereignty, and given that Major Power rivalries on the Security Council can cripple attempts to take effective action. But strategies to circumvent the Council are already being developed:
The idea of excusable breach has been offered as a way of getting around the Security Council when a veto by one or more members is able to prevent a humanitarian intervention. Presumably, according to this strategy, if the need for intervention is widely recognized as desperate enough, a number of states can be excused for acting without a UN mandate, and without UN censure. This could be supported in principle, but it doesn't seem likely to be effective in practice, relying as it does on UN (and Security Council) acquiescence. And the possibility that it can be used as a rationalization for Major Power designs is a valid concern. One saving improvement could be the establishment of a procedural mechanism whereby an excusable breach can be sanctioned by a vote of the General Assembly.
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