Strait History and Iran's Options

The   Military Option

Although American-led Western allies are flexing their muscles by sending battle ships to the Persian Gulf, Washington's own war game exercise, The Millennium Challenge 2002 with a price tag of $250 million, underscored America's inability to defeat Iran.   Oblivious to the lesson of its own making, by sending more warships to the Persian Gulf, the United States is inching towards a full scale conflict.     The inherent danger from the naval buildup is that unlike the Cuban Missile Crisis, the forces in the Persian Gulf are not confined to two leaders who would be able to communicate to stop a run-away situation.    Nor would the consequences of such a potential conflict be limited to the region.     

Given that 17 million barrels of oil a day, or 35% of the world's seaborne oil exports go through the Strait of Hormuz, incidents in the Strait would be fatal for the world economy.     While only 1.1 millions barrels per day goes to the United States, a significant amount of this oil is destined for Europe.   Surely, one must ask why the United States demands that its "European allies" act contrary to their own national interest, pay a higher price for oil by boycotting Iranian oil and running the risk of Iran blocking the passage of other oil-tankers destined for them?  

Again, history has the straight answer.   Contrary to conventional wisdom, the United States   and not the oil-producing countries has used oil as a weapon.   Some examples include the pressure the United States put on Britain in the 1920s to share its oil concessions in the Middle East with U.S. companies.   Post World War II,   the United States violated the terms of the 1928 Red Line Agreement freezing the British and the French out of the Agreement.   

In 1956, the United States made it clear to Britain and France that no oil would be sent to Western Europe unless the two aforementioned countries agreed to a rapid withdrawal from Egypt.   The U.S.   was not opposed to the overthrow of Nasser, but as Eisenhower said: "Had they done it quickly, we would have accepted it " [iii] .     

Demonstrably, although Europe is a major trade partner of the United States, the U.S. does not concern itself with Europe's well being when it comes to executing its foreign policy.     This should come as no surprise, especially since the United States sacrifices its own national interest to promote the Israeli agenda and that of the military industrial complex.     But this does not explain why Europe would shoot itself in the foot at a time when its economical woes have passed the crisis point.  

It is possible that the leaders of Western European countries are beholden to special interest groups -- the pro-Israel lobbies, as the United States is, or they believe Iran will not call their bluff by ratifying the bill passed by Majlis and their oil will be delivered unhindered; perhaps both.   Either way, they are committing financial suicide and their demise may well come before Iran's resolve   is shaken.