Kagan as with many other writers of the political right uses information out of context. His first example is the military spending of Russia, said to be larger than any other country except China and the U.S. A bit disingenuous, as the U.S. budget at $711 billion (not including the money budgeted for Iraq and Afghanistan) dwarfs the Russian budget of $70 billion and China's at $122 billion. The U.S. budget is larger than all the military budgets combined in the world--a claim that Russia is probably quite proud not to make.
Shortly after that argument, Kagan writes of the "billions of dollars in foreign assistance the West provided to Russia in the 1990s were a far cry from the huge sums the victorious powers tried to extract from Germany after 1918." I do not see the connection of how that supports his argument of supposed western generosity towards Russia--rather it hides the idea that most of those funds were used to bail out an economy that threatened to collapse and endanger U.S. interests. The people of Russia never saw the money. The corporate elites of both Russia and the incoming western corporations felt that relief.
Many of his observations of Russia are accurate--and very understandable from a Russian perspective--something U.S. theorists and politicians are incapable of doing, lost in their own exceptionalism and uniqueness. While castigating Putin throughout the work as an "autocrat," he does not mention his popularity in Russia that arises from his strong position vis a vis the U.S., the latter seemingly determined to undermine Russia on every front militarily, economically, and politically regardless of their encouraging words about non-interference in Russian affairs and not having NATO move east to the Russian border. He did make an accurate prediction about Russia's interactions with Tbilisi, wondering what Europe and the U.S. would do if "Russia played hardball in either Ukraine or Georgia? They might well do nothing." All proven true, except that it was Tbilisi that instigated the mini-war that only brought on more U.S. rhetoric about freedom and democracy while they continued to occupy two countries they invaded five years earlier.
For all that Kagan presents about Putin--if one considers Kagan's obvious predisposition and bias--the actual information really provides a positive view of all that Putin has accomplished for Russia. While Russia has serious faults and faultlines, it is a stronger, healthier country now than it is was at the end of the 1990s--and it has avoided most of the economic depredations of western corporations and of the IMF, World Bank, and WTO. Certainly Russia is manipulating for its own national benefit, but with its wealth of natural resources and its own tired history of invasions and interventions from outside, it would seem a rational approach for its own people's security. It could be otherwise, but the apparent and real threats from the west and in particular the U.S. almost require this kind of reaction.
China
Kagan moves on to China, observing interestingly enough that
"as with all great powers, there is also a military aspect to greatness...While becoming a great commercial power, China is also becoming a military power. After all, commercial nations are not pacific nations."
This only adds support to the arguments above about capitalism and democracy and only provides contradiction to Kagan's initial idea. The "hidden fist" of "democratic capitalism" heavily denies the democracy function, and perhaps unwittingly supports the idea that capitalism is based on a warrior economy (as if there should be any doubt of that in any serious person's consideration of events versus rhetoric).
There is also a strange twist to the globalization argument, more than likely unintended by Kagan, when he says, "Never before has China been so closely bound up with the rest of the world...And therefore China needs a modern capable military." Again, does that mean that globalization necessitates militarization (the U.S. example would indicate yes, it does)? Does then capitalism rely on military capabilities and require militarization for 'success' however it is measured? Kagan's rationale seems to indicate that --in contradiction again to his main idea of freedom and democracy via capitalism--yes, it does. The argument underscores the belief that international relations involve military interactions, and while Kagan superficially seems to be against the militancy of nationalism, his own arguments tend to indicate that underneath it all--if globalization is a sign of capitalism writ large--then military power is a component of capitalism, making it not even remotely democratic. It is not the 'demos' the people, that call for war, unless manipulated by the elites who tend not being the ones who do the fighting and killing (and dying).
The arguments Kagan makes concerning China reflect powerfully on the U.S. as well. He acknowledges that the Chinese "don't believe any of this, and with reason." What they don't believe is the rhetoric thrown out by the U.S. about peaceful globalization, and therefore China does not need military programs. While throwing out the jargonistic term "postmodern," itself undefined but substantively meaning we need to give in to the U.S. view, Kagan does admit the reality of "whether the United States itself would ever follow its own advice and abjure power politics."
"Errors of commission and omission"
The latter statement leads into some accurate perspectives that Kagan provides in observing the U.S.' own actions around the world. When he asks "did the United States pull back from its extended global involvements [military] and become a more passive, restrained presence in the world?" he knows and acknowledges that "The answer to this question is no." Rather, "Unchecked by Soviet power" the U.S. "attempted to establish, where possible, the kind of democratic and free-market capitalistic order that Americans [3] preferred." As argued above, democracy and free markets are nothing but rhetoric useful to U.S. interpretations of their own economic, financial, and military depredations in other countries. Anyone who has followed current events should know that the U.S. took full advantage of their power, did not reduc--yet rather increased--their militancy and global domination economically (now viewed rather dimly through the awareness of global economic meltdown) for their own power and wealth. Quite simply, they blew the chance for a true global peace if they had actually listened to the rest of the world and had not gone off on their own unilateral supreme dominance quest.
Other comments from Kagan concerning U.S. foreign policy hold true:
"This expansive, even aggressive global policy was consistent with American foreign policy traditions."
"Americans want what they want, and not just economic opportunity and security but also a world that roughly suits their political and moral preferences."
"The United States, though traditionally jealous of its own sovereignty, has always been ready to interfere in the internal affairs of other nations."
"The United States, of course, paid this [national sovereignty] little heed--it had intervened and overthrown sovereign governments dozens of times throughout its history."
Unfortunately, these honest expressions of what the U.S. is really about are accompanied by the ongoing rhetoric of U.S. exceptionalism and good intentions:
"A nation that cherishes self-determination is uncomfortable depriving others of that right."
"...the noble generosity of spirit and perception of enlightened self-interest that lead the United States out into the world to assist others...."
The latter statement is preceded by the predominant excuse for U.S. global bullying, that any "mistakes" made by the U.S., anything that goes wrong, all the "misperceptions" held by foreigners, is "...an American problem, due to errors of commission and omission, not only in recent years, but throughout history."
So all those wars and fights and battles from the first genocide of native Americans through to Iraq and Afghanistan (have I been here before?) are not because we are evil-minded imperialists searching for power, wealth, control without concern for any other, but because we have made some mistakes along the way. Everyone is entitled to mistakes, but to make the same ones over and over--and over again--indicates the lack of ability to learn, a collective will to not care, and an underlying motive against the very motives constantly reiterated, yet ignored by U.S. politicians, military, economic, and media personnel.
(Note: You can view every article as one long page if you sign up as an Advocate Member, or higher).
1
1
1
