Then Washington went further down this slippery slope, making the incredible statement that "all options" would be on the table against Syria if it turned out that Syria had sent Scuds--an absurdly primitive weapon with which to balance Israeli military might--to helpless Lebanon's Hezbollah. Are we to believe that Washington decision-makers have floated so far into the Twilight Zone that they would launch nuclear war against everyone who talks back? Or have "all options" suddenly metamorphasized into a code word, as I have advocated regarding Israel [OpEd News 3/16/10] and Iran [Foreign Policy comment 3/7/10], for"ah""all" options, including sympathy and compromise? Perhaps they have, but somehow I doubt it.
The rising acceptance of invasion, the collective punishment of civilians, and the use of nuclear weapons illustrates the perilous dynamics of a zero-sum view of history.
Positive-Sum Dynamics
Positive-sum dynamics are harder to get started because they suffer from the reputation of being "dangerous," as though the events of the last 15 years in Grozniy, New York, Afghanistan, Iraq, Palestine, and Lebanon were somehow "not dangerous." The very actors who implement these zero-sum policies are the first to warn of the dangers, citing Hezbollah rockets or Pakistani rebels or Iranian nuclear infrastructure, yet they persist in employing the very tactics that push the world further toward realization of the extreme zero-sum mental model.
Yet the trend toward a zero-sum world took place one step at a time. Public rhetoric only slowly lost its sense of morality. War on cities only slowly became commonplace. What might have happened if the West had seriously condemned Russia's flattening of Grozniy? What would have happened if Washington, basking in the glow of global sympathy on 9/11, had called for an international police action to arrest and bring to trial international terrorists? What would have happened after Israel's retreat from Lebanon in 2000 if Lebanon's security had been guaranteed? What would have happened if Israel's attack on Jenin had been used by the West as evidence that Palestinians must be given justice? What would have happened if the legally elected Hamas administration of Palestine in 2006 had been supported rather than overthrown?
What would happen if the West now recognized the right of all countries to obtain medical-grade uranium for whatever medical use that those countries would open to full international inspection? What would happen if Washington endorsed international calls for a nuclear-free Mideast and called on Israel and Iran jointly to adopt a policy of nuclear transparency? What would happen if Washington guaranteed the integrity of Lebanon's borders? What would happen if Washington stated that it favored the security of all Mideast societies and that it was replacing its Israeli-centric strategy with a strategy of Mideast multipolarity, in which Washington would work closely with all regional powers that were willing to work with it, without requiring that they accept all of Washington's policies?
None of these actions would instantly transform the balance of power. None of these actions would irretrievably imperil any country's security. Each would be just a step that could be reversed, slowed, or redirected.
These questions point out the many opportunities for reversing the cycle of violence and suggest that the sparking of a benign dynamic founded on a perception of history as positive-sum might not only be possible but might increase the security of all.
NOTE: This article expands on "Mideast peace or fascism?" Online Journal 3/16/10
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