7
6
3
In other words the influence of the Israel Lobby is seeping ever deeper into the ranks of the intelligence community.
Military Mindset
It seems altogether possible that Admiral Blair, accustomed to military command authority, assumed he had the right to appoint his senior staff and did not think to check out the naming of Freeman with White House and other politicians hypersensitive to pressure from the Lobby.
And this points up a host of other problems. One is that of having military officers, active or retired, running national intelligence. It appears to be beyond their ken to consider resigning on principle.
I imagine it never occurred to Blair that he might have quit on the spot as soon as he learned that Freeman was being jettisoned a couple of hours after Blair had praised him to the skies; or that, earlier, he might have threatened to resign if the Obama administration let itself be bullied in this way.
Blair is no neophyte, but he clearly underestimated the Lobby’s power compared with his own. It appears the White House told Blair to treat the Freeman appointment as though in the subjunctive mood—long enough to “run it up the flagpole and see who salutes,” as the saying goes.
Then, when the Lobby made sure there were no salutes, but rather the strongest and most scurrilous spitting, Freeman was hauled on down. That may be the way they do things in Chicago, as well as in Washington.
The Freeman flip-flop is merely the latest sign that Obama is afraid to take on the Lobby. But the world is watching the new president. Most will interpret the new president’s acquiescence in this charade as a sign of weakness—of his not being his own man. This is a distinct liability as Obama prepares to meet next month with the likes of Vladimir Putin who will be taking his measure.
The encounter with Putin brings to mind another young president’s first meeting with Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev in Vienna in June 1961.
Khrushchev had studied the fiasco of the Bay of Pigs in April 1961; he would have understood if Kennedy had chosen either to leave Castro alone or to destroy him. When Kennedy was rash enough to approve a strike on Cuba but not bold enough to finish the job, in Khrushchev’s view, the latter decided he was dealing with an inexperienced young leader who could be intimidated and blackmailed—one who would shrink from hard decisions.
Kennedy later said of his encounter with Khrushchev in Vienna, "He beat the hell out of me." The meeting gave him to believe that Kennedy might well back down if the USSR put missiles in Cuba.
As for Israel, the Russians were better able to understand Washington’s “passionate attachment” to Israel in strategic terms, as the Cold War played out in the Middle East and Washington had a perceived need to have Israel as a permanent “battleship” there. Now the Russians see the power of the Israel Lobby for what it is—who can miss it? The Obama administration is seen as caving under political pressure.
Although the Russians continue to be amazed at the Lobby’s strong influence over U.S. policy, the Russians are happy as clams to sit back and watch as the identification of the U.S. with Israeli policy inflicts incalculable damage to U.S. interests throughout the region and beyond.
Though a sportsman, Putin is best at chess. He is likely to shy away from playing basketball with our new president. Obama will have to beat Putin at his own game—and Obama now has shown himself easy to push around.
Israeli Adventurism
With Freeman’s withdrawal, there is surely much gloating among the politically aware in Israel. Gloating is one thing; dangerous miscalculation is another.
The danger is particularly high as Benjamin Netanyahu takes over as Israeli prime minister. Netanyahu and his close “neoconservative” friends in the U.S. make no bones about their preference for a Bush/Cheney-style preventive strike on Iran’s nuclear facilities.
