Leaving Afghanistan

A war between the Pashtun and non-Pashtun people would be bloody and interminable, and this is clear to all sides. Facing stalemate, most will see the obvious advantages of negotiating power-sharing arrangements and regional autonomy -- a state of affairs that has worked well for Afghanistan in the past, including periods of national greatness.

The Future of al Qaeda

The most often heard argument for continuing the US effort in Afghanistan is that al Qaeda will re-establish its training camps there, from which it will direct terrorist operations around the world. Concern over al Qaeda bases is understandably strong in the United States, but they are highly unlikely. The Taliban have stated that they seek to rid their country of foreigners and will not allow foreign extremists to return -- an obvious reference to al Qaeda. Now, of course there is no reason to take their word on the matter, but there are compelling reasons to doubt an al Qaeda return to Afghanistan.

The Taliban have historically been insular and generally uninterested in the bold internationalist schemes of al Qaeda. Some interpreters of the movement claim that the Taliban adopted al Qaeda's internationalist position after western powers invaded in 2001 and drove them into Pakistan, but there is little evidence of this. Other analysts say the opposite, that the Taliban have maintained their insularity, blame al Qaeda for being driven out of their country, and want nothing to do with conquering the region let alone establishing a caliphate. A caliphate, of course, would entail a loss of Afghan sovereignty. And, in that sovereignty is something Afghans have long cherished and fought for, they are not going to allow Arabs to run their affairs.

Though bin Laden's forces served alongside the Taliban's for many years, there has long been tension between foreign jihadists and indigenous fighters dating back to the Soviet war. In addition to the jihadists' reckless zealotry, they also displayed a condescension toward the locals' uncultured ways and religious impurities. Whatever superiority they might have, al Qaeda is blamed for the ouster of the Taliban, who were content with Islamism in one country and hardly hostile to the West, including the US, as the Kazakhstan-Pakistan pipeline negotiations indicate.

Over the last few years, al Qaeda's importance in the region has dropped significantly. They are presently far behind the numbers and skills of the Afghan Taliban, the Pakistani Taliban, Hizb-i Islami, and the Haqqani bands. Those groups no longer rely on al Qaeda for training or funding, perhaps as a result of distancing themselves from the haughty and reckless Arab guests.

Another cause for doubting an al Qaeda return to Afghanistan is that they cannot rebuild their bases or otherwise operate openly. American and to some extent Pakistani intelligence, are hunting the al Qaeda leadership in the tribal agencies and have been successful in killing many second-tier leaders. Regardless of the government in Kabul, al Qaeda cannot operate openly. It is far safer where it is, in the tribal agencies.

The forces of al Qaeda would do well to remain in hiding in Pakistan, or better to leave the region. The US army reports that al Qaeda's presence in Afghanistan has been negligible for the last year. The Arab jihadists might well be leaving the region for Yemen, Somalia, Algeria, and Morocco, where their role will not be as small as it is now along the Af-Pak frontier.

Warnings of dire consequences following a US/NATO withdrawal from Afghanistan are not convincing. Indeed, the US will benefit from leaving. An Afghan pullout, along with the already mandated one from Iraq, would ease anti-western sentiment in the Islamic world and greatly weaken support for al Qaeda and kindred Islamist terrorist groups that thrive on the presence of foreign troops in the region. As paradoxical as it might appear to political leaders and to believers in the universal utility of might, a lower profile in the Islamic world would serve American interests and improve their national security. And of course Americans would benefit from suffering far fewer casualties in a distant and probably un-winnable war.

Brian M. Downing is the author of several works of political and military history, including The Military Revolution and Political Change and The Paths of Glory: War and Social Change in America from the Great War to Vietnam. He can be reached atbrianmdowning@gmail.com.