Although President Abbas demonstrated a keen interest in reaching a peace accord, disavowed violence, and committed himself to ending the conflict by seeking a political solution, he was unable for several reasons to make any major concessions without linking it to a solution to other conflicting issues.
First, Abbas was negotiating from a position of weakness and in order to strengthen his position, he demanded that Israel make an important gesture first, such as suspending settlement expansion and releasing Palestinian prisoners, which Israel generally rejected.
Second, there was and still exists serious discord between the PA and Hamas, whereby neither can see eye-to-eye about the negotiating process.
Third, Hamas continues to call for the destruction of Israel and refuses to renounce violence as a tool to achieve its political objective, which is incompatible with the PA's position.
As a result, the formation of a unity government between the PA and Hamas in April 2014 could not be sustained, as it was impossible for the PA to present a united front in the peace negotiations.
In addition, Netanyahu refused to negotiate with such a 'unity government' as long as Hamas continued to reject the three Quartet requirements: recognize Israel, renounce violence, and accept prior agreements between Israel and the Palestinians.
Finally, the Palestinians have been trapped in their rancorous public narrative against Israel even during the peace negotiations further damaging their credibility in the eyes of many Israelis. The PA, not to speak of Hamas, seems to want to win the public relations campaign with their own people more than winning the peace.
This has been coupled with widespread anti-Israeli teaching in schools, regular media attacks, and indoctrination in many public and private institutions.
The PA seems to ignore the fact that their constant anti-Israeli public sentiments play into the hands of the powerful Israeli right-wing constituency while weakening the hands of the center and left-of-center, further deepening the distrust between them.
The latter represent the majority of the Israeli electorate who seek to make peace but remain concerned about the Palestinians' ultimate intentions.
In addition, the Palestinian officials' public acrimony against the Israelis further stifled the voices of moderate Palestinians, including in the media. This left the field wide open for extremists, especially Hamas and Islamic Jihad, to promote their resistance to Israel to a receptive Palestinian public.
To be sure, Yasser Arafat, who was a unifying force that exemplified the Palestinian resistance and enjoyed their trust, concluded that Israel is an irreversible reality and switched gears by signing the Oslo Accords.
His successor Abbas, while remaining committed to peace, did not enjoy the same overwhelming support of the Palestinians. The conflict with Hamas and the loss of control over Gaza further weakened him, making it difficult for him to take bold steps to advance the peace process.
Given the internal political conditions among the Israelis and Palestinians, it has become increasingly clear that only international intervention would provide the practical channel that could change the dynamic of the peace negotiations.
Being that France is planning to submit a new framework for peace to the UNSC, the Obama administration can shape the resolution by making it consistent with its position in support of a two-state solution.
Otherwise, any bilateral Israeli-Palestinians negotiation will be an exercise in futility, and the continuing impasse will only lead to a mutually self-destructive path.
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