Article: Iran: Will She or Won't She?

Will Israel launch on Iran? Again, no one can be certain, but the Council on Foreign Relations assessed this probability. There is little doubt that Israel views the stakes as very high. Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu's UN General Assembly speech emphasized the existential nature of the threat that he and others in the current government believe Iran represents. The CFR reported that "An Israeli attack would likely concentrate on three locations: Isfahan, where Iran produces uranium hexafluoride gas; Natanz, where the gas is enriched in approximately half of the 8,000 centrifuges located there; and Arak, where a heavy water research reactor, scheduled to come on line in 2012, would be ideal to produce weapons-grade plutonium. It is conceivable that Israel may attack other sites that it suspects to be part of a nuclear weapons program if targeting data were available, such as the recently disclosed Qom site, whose location is known, or centrifuge fabrication sites, the location(s) of which have not yet been identified. The latter would be compelling targets since their destruction would hobble Iran's ability to reconstitute its program."

After making it clear that Israel has the means for such an attack, CFR states, "The likelihood of this contingency depends on Israeli assessments of U.S. and international resolve to block Iran's pursuit of a nuclear weapons capability; the state of the Iranian program; the amount of time a successful strike would buy to be worth the expected risks and costs, a point on which there is a spectrum of Israeli views, from six months to five years; whether Israel believes there is a clandestine Iranian program, which would lead some Israelis to conclude that an attack would not buy any time at all; and the effect of a strike on the U.S.-Israel relationship.

Because none of these factors is constant, estimates about the likelihood of an Israeli strike within the coming year will vary. For example, Israel is probably somewhat less likely to attack now than it was before the Qom installation was disclosed, the P-3 took a firmer stance, and Russia appeared to concede that stronger sanctions had to be considered. If Iran were to agree to ship the bulk of its uranium to France and Russia for enrichment -- a deal that has been agreed upon in working level negotiations but may never be consummated -- Israel's incentive to accept the risks of an attack against Iran would probably diminish. Should diplomatic initiatives run aground, the likelihood of an Israeli attack could be expected to increase accordingly."

As some have pointed out, including CFR, there are problems with such an attack, problems that make the venture highly risky. The perils relate to the possible routes to the target. There are three plausible routes to Iran and they involve over-flight of third countries. The northern approach would likely follow the Syrian-Turkish border and risk violation of Turkey's airspace. The central flight path would cross Jordan and Iraq. The southern route would transit the lower end of Jordan, Saudi Arabia and possibly Kuwait.

All but two of these countries are to a greater or lesser degree hostile to Israel. The exceptions, Jordan and Turkey, would not wish their airspace to be used for an Israeli attack against Iran. Turkey recently canceled an annual trilateral exercise involving Israel, in part to signal its opposition to an Israeli strike. In any case, over-flight would jeopardize Israeli diplomatic relations with both countries.

CFR states, "With respect to Syria and Saudi Arabia, operational concerns would trump diplomatic ones. If either country detects Israeli aircraft and chooses to challenge the over-flight using surface-to-air missiles or intercepting aircraft, Israel's intricate attack plan, which would have a razor-thin margin for error to begin with, could well be derailed."

The most advantageous route is the central route. It is the shortest route as opposed to the round-about nature of the northern and southern routes, saving valuable fuel. Also, the route takes it over friendly nations, Jordan and American-controlled skies over Iraq. It is also the most dangerous for the U.S., Israel, and possibly, the Israeli attack aircraft. Over-flight of Iraq, would be diplomatically awkward for Israel and would risk a deadly clash with American air defenses since the intruding aircraft would not have the appropriate Identification, Friend, or Foe (IFF) codes.

Israel would have to carefully weigh the operational risk and most of all the cost of a strike to its most vital bilateral relationship, especially since President Barack Obama has explicitly asked Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu not to order an attack. There are very serious doubts that American forces would engage an Israeli strike force bound for Iran's nuclear facilities. Both countries share the same fear: Iran is building a nuclear bomb.Therein lies the danger. If Iran were attacked via the skies over Iraq, would there be any doubt of American complicity? The reader is reminded that the U.S. has permanent military bases and airfields on Iran's western border, Iraq, and eastern border, Afghanistan.

In addition, CFR points out that "The sheer distances involved pose a challenge, as well. The targets lie at the outermost 1,750- kilometer range limits of Israeli tactical aircraft. Diplomatic and military factors would confine Israeli refueling operations to international airspace where tankers could orbit safely for long periods. These locations, while usable, are suboptimal. They would yield the attackers little leeway to loiter in their target areas, or engage in the fuel-intensive maneuvering typical of dogfights and evasion of surface-to-air missiles."

None of the above describes the economic impact of an Israeli attack on Iran. The impact can be illustrated by one of CFR's recommendations for the U.S. -- Ensure the U.S. Strategic Petroleum Reserve is sufficient to offset shortages if necessary. Unlike Israel's attack on the Osirak facility in Iraq in 1981 and her attack on the al-Kibar facility in Syria in 2007, Israel was relatively certain that neither Iraq nor Syria would retaliate. Both were bloodied and weak at the time. Today, Iran is neither bloodied nor weak. It does not take a genius to figure out that, if attacked by the Jewish nation, Iran will retaliate.

Second only to Saudi Arabia, Iran is a huge source of the world's oil. Due to a quirk in geography, she also sits astride an oil choke point, the 29-mile wide Strait of Hormuz, through which 20% of the world's oil shipments pass. She also possesses some of the most sophisticated mine-layer technology in the world, and she does not possess these weapons by accident, but for a very distinct purpose -- to close the strait when she wishes.

On June 29, 2008, the commander of Iran's Revolutionary Guard, Ali Mohammed Jafari, said that if Iran were attacked by Israel or the United States, it would seal off the Strait of Hormuz, to wreak havoc in oil markets. This statement followed other more ambiguous threats from Iran's oil minister and other government officials that an attack on Iran would result in turmoil in oil supply.

For every action there is a reaction. If Israel attacks Iran, Iran will retaliate. That is known. What will be the nature of that retaliation? Will she attack American bases in Iraq and Afghanistan? Will she close the strait? Will Iran be satisfied by merely attacking Israel? Can Israel withstand the onslaught? What will be the nature of Israel's and America's reaction to Iran's reaction? And, so, on it goes. No one, of course, knows.

I offer no conclusions to this report. The possibilities are endless, and I forgot to take my prophesy pill this morning. I can only hope the reader is more aware of the issues. Oh, and, by the way, we can all hope that cooler heads will prevail. If not, I can offer this conclusion. If Israel attacks Iran, 9/11, the endless wars in Iraq and Afghanistan will be child's play in comparison.

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