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Has Bratton's LAPD Really Reformed?
By Tom Hayden (about the author)
Become a Fan (1 fan) -- Page 2 of 4 page(s)
There is no question that the LAPD has vastly improved its image since Chief Bratton took over in October 2002. Current approval ratings for the LAPD are 77 percent citywide, including 68 percent in the black community and 76 percent among Latinos. A recent Los Angeles Times op-ed headline implored "Set the LAPD Free," as if the cops were slaves and the judge was Pharaoh.
The changes were substantive, not simply symbolic. Bratton supported the consent decree and even served as a consultant on the process before becoming chief. Incidents of "categorical force" (use of a firearm, choke hold, head strike with a weapon, injuries requiring hospitalization) have declined over the past eight years--a good thing. The department became notably more interactive with the leadership of the black and Latino communities. Gang intervention workers gradually were brought in from the cold, though their acceptance by police varied from precinct to precinct and the LAPD was provided with no policy directive to cooperate with them.
But there continued to be another side to the LAPD, only occasionally revealed. When the LAPD's Metro unit abruptly stormed into a large immigrant rights assembly on May Day 2007, beating, gassing and using rubber bullets, even trampling on many in the media, for a brief moment it appeared that the "old" LAPD was back in full force, coupling overreaction with overkill. But the blossoming public relations problem was contained and framed as an "isolated" one--as if the huge paramilitary Metro unit had been overlooked in the march to reform. So powerful was the civic desire to believe in reform that the May Day episode gradually faded away. Yet it could not have been a clearer indication that the "old" LAPD lurked below the surface. In the aftermath, a deputy chief was removed and quickly retired, but none of the nineteen officers originally accused of using excessive force were fired.
The riot by Metro was a visible suggestion that the LAPD pursues a two-track approach, a velvet glove toward the public and an iron hand toward the underclass. Bratton privately calls those sympathetic to ex-gang members "thug huggers," while still endorsing the city's funding for gang intervention work. The analogy is a stretch, but the policy is akin to the Pentagon's effort to distinguish between "reconcilables" and "irreconcilables" on the battlefield. In defending these policies, Bratton often has spoken of "the head that needs to be cut off," street gangs as "much more of a national threat than the Mafia was" and a menace requiring "an internal war on terrorism." That perspective allows little, if any, police tolerance of constitutional rights of accused gang members. They are the new untouchables.
This policy is illustrated in the gang injunctions that blanket most of Los Angeles, and that are based on building secret databases and providing jail penalties for mere "association" or loitering between gang members, the use of cellphones, possession of alcohol, wearing of "gang attire" and other lifestyle crimes. The state Senate recently approved a bill to allow suspected gang members to remove themselves from the lists if they remain clean for five years. The measure is opposed by law enforcement and stalled in the Assembly.
The two-track approach by the LAPD arises from the nature of the federal consent decree itself, which says remarkably little about the gang issues that were at the center of the Rampart history. The CRASH units were dissolved and repackaged with more supervision. Otherwise the decree was based on a civil liberties model, not opposition to the "war on gangs" model. Based on a 1993 Congressional amendment to a tough-on-crime bill, the 191 mandates of the consent decree are aimed at "patterns and practices" which lead to constitutional violations. It is focused on racial profiling while the Rampart issues were about gang profiling. Similar to McCarthy-era laws, the consent decree provides little protection to gang members, who form the core of a new suspect class. The ACLU, in calling for the consent decree, looked only for plaintiffs who were clean, young inner-city youth without records, not young people with criminal records or immigrants like Sanchez who were the chief targets of CRASH policing.
The Beat Goes On
A May 2009 Harvard University study, requested by Bratton, contains relevant evidence on the continuing disparities in policing under the LA consent decree. While very favorable to the LAPD, the sixty-eight-page report never mentions gangs. It is more concerned with the question of whether the consent decree has undermined police work. The authors' answer is no: reform and "law and order" go hand in hand.
A careful reading reveals the following:
"-On the issue of non-categorical force (stun guns, bean bag shotguns, non-lethal use of force to gain compliance, etc.), there was a 17 percent increase in the LAPD's Central Bureau between 2006 and 2009.
"-"A troubling pattern in the use of force is that African Americans, and to a lesser extent Hispanics, are subjects of the use of such force out of proportion to their share of involuntary contacts with the LAPD."
"-Stops by LAPD officers rose from 587,200 in 2002 to 875,204 in 2008, a jump of 49 percent. Total pedestrian stops doubled in six years while the number of vehicle stops rose 40 percent.
"-The greatest increases in stops took place in gang territories, the Central, Southeast, Newton and Hollenbeck divisions. Times columnist Tim Rutten tries to explains this surge as "the department's attempt to ensure that black and Latino Angelenos have equal access to public safety." But as Rampart Reconsidered points out, these are the zones where the gloves are most likely to come off. The LAPD inspector general, Andre Birotte, said last year that "they are still beating heads" in South Central Los Angeles, while police violence had declined in the heavily monitored Rampart precinct.
"-Hispanics were 43 percent of all persons stopped in 2002 and 48 percent in 2008. Blacks made up 36 percent of all pedestrians stopped.
"-Between 2002 and 2008, the likelihood of arrest "nearly doubled" for both pedestrians and car stops. The total number of LAPD arrests increased 18 percent from 2002 to 2008, from 147,605 to 173,742.
"-Part One index crime offenses (non-negligent homicide, rape, robbery, aggravated assault, burglary, car theft) declined to 15 percent of all LAPD arrests in 2007.
"-"Steep increases" in arrests occurred in so-called Part Two (less serious) offenses such as disorderly conduct, prostitution, DUI, etc.
Become a Fan (1 fan) -- Page 2 of 4 page(s)
The changes were substantive, not simply symbolic. Bratton supported the consent decree and even served as a consultant on the process before becoming chief. Incidents of "categorical force" (use of a firearm, choke hold, head strike with a weapon, injuries requiring hospitalization) have declined over the past eight years--a good thing. The department became notably more interactive with the leadership of the black and Latino communities. Gang intervention workers gradually were brought in from the cold, though their acceptance by police varied from precinct to precinct and the LAPD was provided with no policy directive to cooperate with them.
But there continued to be another side to the LAPD, only occasionally revealed. When the LAPD's Metro unit abruptly stormed into a large immigrant rights assembly on May Day 2007, beating, gassing and using rubber bullets, even trampling on many in the media, for a brief moment it appeared that the "old" LAPD was back in full force, coupling overreaction with overkill. But the blossoming public relations problem was contained and framed as an "isolated" one--as if the huge paramilitary Metro unit had been overlooked in the march to reform. So powerful was the civic desire to believe in reform that the May Day episode gradually faded away. Yet it could not have been a clearer indication that the "old" LAPD lurked below the surface. In the aftermath, a deputy chief was removed and quickly retired, but none of the nineteen officers originally accused of using excessive force were fired.
The riot by Metro was a visible suggestion that the LAPD pursues a two-track approach, a velvet glove toward the public and an iron hand toward the underclass. Bratton privately calls those sympathetic to ex-gang members "thug huggers," while still endorsing the city's funding for gang intervention work. The analogy is a stretch, but the policy is akin to the Pentagon's effort to distinguish between "reconcilables" and "irreconcilables" on the battlefield. In defending these policies, Bratton often has spoken of "the head that needs to be cut off," street gangs as "much more of a national threat than the Mafia was" and a menace requiring "an internal war on terrorism." That perspective allows little, if any, police tolerance of constitutional rights of accused gang members. They are the new untouchables.
This policy is illustrated in the gang injunctions that blanket most of Los Angeles, and that are based on building secret databases and providing jail penalties for mere "association" or loitering between gang members, the use of cellphones, possession of alcohol, wearing of "gang attire" and other lifestyle crimes. The state Senate recently approved a bill to allow suspected gang members to remove themselves from the lists if they remain clean for five years. The measure is opposed by law enforcement and stalled in the Assembly.
The two-track approach by the LAPD arises from the nature of the federal consent decree itself, which says remarkably little about the gang issues that were at the center of the Rampart history. The CRASH units were dissolved and repackaged with more supervision. Otherwise the decree was based on a civil liberties model, not opposition to the "war on gangs" model. Based on a 1993 Congressional amendment to a tough-on-crime bill, the 191 mandates of the consent decree are aimed at "patterns and practices" which lead to constitutional violations. It is focused on racial profiling while the Rampart issues were about gang profiling. Similar to McCarthy-era laws, the consent decree provides little protection to gang members, who form the core of a new suspect class. The ACLU, in calling for the consent decree, looked only for plaintiffs who were clean, young inner-city youth without records, not young people with criminal records or immigrants like Sanchez who were the chief targets of CRASH policing.
The Beat Goes On
A May 2009 Harvard University study, requested by Bratton, contains relevant evidence on the continuing disparities in policing under the LA consent decree. While very favorable to the LAPD, the sixty-eight-page report never mentions gangs. It is more concerned with the question of whether the consent decree has undermined police work. The authors' answer is no: reform and "law and order" go hand in hand.
A careful reading reveals the following:
"-On the issue of non-categorical force (stun guns, bean bag shotguns, non-lethal use of force to gain compliance, etc.), there was a 17 percent increase in the LAPD's Central Bureau between 2006 and 2009.
"-"A troubling pattern in the use of force is that African Americans, and to a lesser extent Hispanics, are subjects of the use of such force out of proportion to their share of involuntary contacts with the LAPD."
"-Stops by LAPD officers rose from 587,200 in 2002 to 875,204 in 2008, a jump of 49 percent. Total pedestrian stops doubled in six years while the number of vehicle stops rose 40 percent.
"-The greatest increases in stops took place in gang territories, the Central, Southeast, Newton and Hollenbeck divisions. Times columnist Tim Rutten tries to explains this surge as "the department's attempt to ensure that black and Latino Angelenos have equal access to public safety." But as Rampart Reconsidered points out, these are the zones where the gloves are most likely to come off. The LAPD inspector general, Andre Birotte, said last year that "they are still beating heads" in South Central Los Angeles, while police violence had declined in the heavily monitored Rampart precinct.
"-Hispanics were 43 percent of all persons stopped in 2002 and 48 percent in 2008. Blacks made up 36 percent of all pedestrians stopped.
"-Between 2002 and 2008, the likelihood of arrest "nearly doubled" for both pedestrians and car stops. The total number of LAPD arrests increased 18 percent from 2002 to 2008, from 147,605 to 173,742.
"-Part One index crime offenses (non-negligent homicide, rape, robbery, aggravated assault, burglary, car theft) declined to 15 percent of all LAPD arrests in 2007.
"-"Steep increases" in arrests occurred in so-called Part Two (less serious) offenses such as disorderly conduct, prostitution, DUI, etc.
http://www.tomhayden.com
After fifty years of activism, politics and writing, Tom Hayden still is a leading voice for ending the war in Iraq, erasing sweatshops, saving the environment, and reforming politics through greater citizen participation.
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