4. Consider giving Moldova and, possibly, Georgia too a conditional and long-term, yet, nevertheless, unambiguous EU membership perspective! Formulate this offer in a way as to make clear that it is, in the case of Moldova , unrelated to Romania 's pressure, and, in the case of Georgia , not due to US demands, i.e. in neither case an extra-ordinary decision. Indicate that such offers may be made to other Eastern Partnership countries which respect common values and show adequate political will, in the future too. This way, Ukraine 's elite and society may finally understand that there is a real chance to join, one day, the EU - if and only if Ukraine starts implementing substantive reforms. Today, there are many people, even in the Ukrainian experts community, who do not believe that Brussels will ever give Ukraine a serious chance to try entering the EU. Explicit future accession prospects for Moldova or/and Georgia , however, will be seen as an implicit membership perspective for Ukraine too - without binding Brussels , in any way.
5. Accelerate the visa liberalization process as much as possible! In a first step, the European Parliament, should, sooner rather than later, ratify the already agreed amendments to the Visa Facilitation Agreement. Second, the EU member states' consulates should become more customer-oriented. The EU's current restrictive visa policies hurt ordinary Ukrainians. These policies' often arbitrary implementation in many consulates across Ukraine have already heavily discredited the European Union in the eyes of tens of thousands of Ukrainians. The EU consulates' complicated visa application rules, heavy processing fees, and sometimes inconsistent, if not ridiculous decision-making on travel or work permits contrast sharply with Russia 's liberal migration regime with Ukraine . Oddly, the EU consulates' policies are frequently slowing down and, sometimes, even hindering Ukrainian-EU cooperation aiming to promote those reforms that Brussels is expecting to accelerate. Third, the EU should reiterate that entirely visa-free travel will become reality once Ukraine has implemented the reform program outlined in the Visa Liberalization Action Plan.
6. Support Ukraine 's approximation efforts in those sectors that are important for the future Association Agreement and where no resistance from particularistic interests to their execution already today exists! Down-to-earth technical standards will, in any way, have to be implemented at some point. If it is possible to move forward already now without yet having the official framework of the Association Agreement, the opportunity to achieve instant progress should be grasped. Energy cooperation requires special attention. East European energy security, diversification and savings as well as modernisation of Ukraine 's gas transportation system should be the EU's particular focus for the next years. Concurrently, implementation of the Russian South Stream project in the Black Sea - aimed at devaluing Ukraine 's major strategic asset, her pipelines network - should be prevented.
7. Engage more actively with some of Ukraine 's so-called "oligarchs"! Politics in Ukraine is, like in other post-Soviet states, a two-level game: What is happening in the public domain is only the tip of the iceberg of what is going on under the carpet. Often substantive decisions in Ukraine are predetermined behind the scenes by actors who may not hold any significant official posts, but control significant parts of Ukraine 's GDP. These "oligarchs" include a variety of personalities - some of whom are more dubious, and some less so. With a selected circle of the latter, the EU should seek a dialogue concerning what the EU wants from the Ukrainian government, and what the Association Agreements means for Ukraine 's economy. More communication with some of Ukraine 's grey cardinals could facilitate closer relations in the official realm. Yet, the EU needs to make sure that such communication is not perceived as an attempt on the part of the EU to support non-transperant structures in Ukraine . We only suggest diversifying channels of communication with Ukraine to include actors who might be interested in bringing Ukraine closer to the EU.
8. Create a Ukraine research and information center providing competent political, economic, social and legal consulting, on current Ukrainian affairs! This center could be publishing a weekly analytical bulletin as well as a monthly or, at least, bimonthly specialized journal on Ukrainian politics, business, history, society etc. Such a center may also hold annual conventions, monthly expert round-tables, irregular public conferences, or occasional press conferences which would bring together academic researchers, policy analysts, journalists, social activists, and decision-makers dealing with Ukraine.
Much of what went wrong in the EU's policies towards Ukraine over the last twenty years has to do with the shockingly scant knowledge, across Europe , about the territorially largest European country. Even high-level bureaucrats in European foreign ministries, chief administrators in major international organizations, influential journalists in leading media outlets, or policy experts in top notch think-tanks often operate with common places, stereotypes, and travesties when it comes to Ukraine . No European country has a center equivalent to the Harvard Ukrainian Research Institute in Massachusetts , or the Canadian Institute for Ukrainian Studies in Alberta . Europe needs at least one analytical center that regularly produces and publishes topical investigations and in-depth research, on contemporary Ukraine . While such a center could also be partially or fully financed by the Ukrainian side, it should be made sure that its scholarly competence, professional reputation, distance to particularistic interests, and position above politics are beyond any doubt.
If implemented swiftly and simultaneously, these measures could produce tangible results in EU-Ukraine relations within a relatively short period of time, e.g. within the next three to five years. They would not cost the EU much, but could strengthen domestic pressure in Ukraine on the current authorities that resist reforms, improve mutual perception between the EU and Ukraine , and consequently change the atmosphere in relations between Kyiv and Brussels . Ukraine is a pivotal country in the creation of a new transatlantic security structure. If Ukraine 's transformations is successful, this will have positive effects across the post-Soviet space and in the Black Sea area. Should the Ukrainian state-building process fail, the repercussions would be felt far beyond Ukraine 's current borders.
First published in Europe , in IP: The Journal of the German Council on Foreign Relations [web edition], 20 November 2012 (https://dgap.org/en/ip-journal/topics/eu-ukraine-relations-after-ukrainian-parliamentary-elections), and the Kyiv newspaper Dzerkalo tyzhnia. An excerpt appeared earlier on the websites of the EUobserver and New Europe.
Iryna Solonenko is a DAAD/OSF researcher of EU Eastern policies at the European University Viadrina of Frankfurt/Oder, Germany, and project leader of the European Integration Index for Eastern Partnership Countries (http://www.eap-index.eu).
Andreas Umland is a DAAD senior lecturer in European studies at the National University of "Kyiv-Mohyla Academy," Ukraine, and general editor of the book series "Soviet and Post-Soviet Politics and Society" (http://www.ibidem-verlag.de/spps.html).
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