That time frame for an Israeli attack was created entirely by the Obama administration. Ehud Barak had not suggested that the attack would come before the end of June. On the contrary, discussing in a CNN interview last November when Iran would reach a "zone of immunity" -- the point at which it would have so much of its uranium enrichment program protected in well-protected facilities that it couldn't be destroyed by an attack -- he had said, "It's true that it wouldn't take three years ... probably three-quarters, before no one can do anything practically about it...."
A story leaked by Secretary of Defence Leon Panetta to Washington Post columnist David Ignatius last week said Panetta believed there was a "strong likelihood" that Israel would attack sometime between April and the end of June. What appeared on the surface to be an expression of US alarm about a strike coming so soon was actually an effort to put pressure on Tehran to make new concessions on its nuclear program before the sanctions take effect.
Instead of characterizing Netanyahu's posture as irrational and reckless, Ignatius chose to depict the official view of a short and relatively painless war with Iran without the slightest hint that it is rejected out of hand by Israeli intelligence and military leaders. Ignatius was presumably prompted by Panetta to characterize it in a way that would make the Israeli threat more credible to Iran.
What really gave away Panetta's intention to pressure Iran, however, was the fact that he used Ignatius to warn Iran that, if it retaliated against Israeli population centres, the US "could feel obligated to come to Israel's defense."
That warning clearly undercut the painstaking efforts the Obama administration had made over the previous two months to signal to Netanyahu that Israel would be on its own if it attacked Iran without prior US agreement. The sudden reversal in Obama's policy dramatically illuminated the deep contradictions built into its policy.
On one hand, Obama has been pursuing a course aimed at avoiding being drawn into an Israeli war with Iran, which both Obama and the military leadership consider as against vital US interests. On the other hand, Obama believes he needs a deal with Iran to demonstrate both to Israel and to the US public that he is succeeding in inducing Iran to retreat from its present stance on its nuclear program.
The belief was supported by the conventional wisdom in the US national security state that Iran can only be brought to the table with an acceptable position through pressure. It is also in line with bit of conventional wisdom: that no Democratic President can afford to openly decouple the US from Israeli security -- especially in relation to Iran.
The contradiction between the two elements of Obama's policy toward Iran went unnoticed in the US. But the real meaning of the leak was certainly understood in Iran as well as in Israel.
There is still time for Obama to repair the damage and to return to the policy he had begun developing in December. But unless Obama warns Netanyahu publicly that an attack against US wishes would indeed mean he is on his own, the chances of deterring him and avoiding war with Iran will be sharply reduced.
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