Though Hussein had no hand in 9/11 and rejected al-Qaeda's religious extremism, Bush and Blair clambered onboard for an invasion of Iraq. Their differences were mostly tactical, such as whether to present the WMD case to the United Nations or to simply act unilaterally with the so-called "coalition of the willing."
According to Blair's memoir, hardliner Cheney opposed going to the UN at all, but Blair argued that the move was politically necessary and won over Bush during a visit to Camp David on Sept. 7, 2002.
"Once George declared he was in favour of going the UN route, the visit relaxed," Blair wrote. "Dick Cheney had been there for part of the time, and made it clear he was not for going down the UN route. He was unremittingly hard line."
Common Ground
But Blair explained that Cheney's aggressive attitude differed from the Bush-Blair approach only by degree, not fundamentally. In that regard, Blair said he considered Cheney as unfairly maligned by progressives and many centrists.
"To those on the left, he is, of course, an uncomplicated figure of loathing," Blair wrote. "Even for the middle ground, they tend to reach for the garlic and crucifixes. You have to go pretty far right to find Dick's natural constituency.
"My take on him was different from that of most people. I thought he had one central insight which was at least worth taking seriously. He believed, in essence, that the U.S. was genuinely at war. " [And his response was] we're coming after you, so change or be changed."
Though acknowledging that Cheney's "attitude terrified and repelled people," Blair expressed a degree of solidarity with the former vice president, saying:
"I did not think [Cheney's position] was as fantastical as conventional wisdom opined. It is one struggle. Our enemy has an ideology. It does threaten us. The ultimate answer is in the spread of democracy and freedom. It is even possible to conceive of this, in different language, as being a progressive position, certainly where removing someone like Saddam was concerned.
"My problem with the way he put it and wanted to do it was that the manner of doing it was incomplete. Precisely because the war was based loosely around an ideology, the fight had to be waged and won at the level of ideas and in a way that would appeal not to us, but to those who had fallen or might fall prey to that ideology.
"In other words, it couldn't be a hard-power strategy alone. It had to encompass more than military might. It had to engage the people out in the Middle East, in the Muslim world, and had to build alliances within that world.
"This wasn't some namby-pamby peacenikery; it was a critical part of winning."
In other words, Blair saw Cheney's determination to overthrow U.S.-disliked leaders in the Middle East as more a problem of PR tactics than core strategy.
Despite the widespread impression that Cheney's grandiose neocon scheme for remaking the Middle East through warfare represented an extreme vision, Blair indicated that he and other supposed moderates shared Cheney's broader determination to replace anti-U.S. and anti-Israeli governments across the Middle East with more compliant regimes under the banner of "democracy."
That, in turn, suggests the danger of a wider regional war has not fully abated.
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