Mounting evidence shows that votes cast via non-English language displays on DREs are subject to separate treatment by the DRE, and subject to some votes being blanked out.
1. HAVA and HR811 - Voting Machines' Impact on Minority Communities
www.wheresthepaper.org/HAVAandHR811MinorityImpact070330.htm
2. Wrong Time for an E-vote Glitch - Evidence that minority ballots can be handled
"differently" www.wheresthepaper.org/WrongTimeForAnEvoteGlitch.htm
3. New Mexico - 2 DREs accounted for 8% Hispanic and Native American undervotes
www.votersunite.org/info/NM_UVbyMachineandEthnicity.pdf
4. New Mexico undervote rate plummets after switch from DREs to paper ballots
www.votersunite.org/info/NM_UVbyBallotTypeandEthnicity.pdf
5. Palm Beach County, Florida, Parallel Testing Program, Findings (lost votes on Spanish ballots, pages 24-27) www.wheresthepaper.org/Limited_Parallel_Testing_Findings.pdf
6. PRLDEF statement, www.wheresthepaper.org/PRLDEF5_07PaperBallots.pdf
This section of S1487 empowers the EAC to set separate or no benchmarks for "distinct communities" that they "study" and assert have high "historical intentional undervoting," thus establishing a legal reason to ignore evidence of fraud, and legitimize and continue historical patterns of disenfranchisement under a new guise.
This section empowers the EAC to "estimate" and use only "available research" rather than do new research or exit polls, and falsely asserts that Congress has found that certain people like to undervote.
Solution
This section on error rates and benchmarks should be eliminated. The law should require that high undervote rates should trigger openly- and meaningfully-observed forensic computer examination of the specific machines used, to determine whether ethnic profiling and targeting of minorities has taken place.
8. Certification
Under current law, each state can set its own voting system standards, and decide whether its voting systems must meet federal standards.
Under S1487, no voting system in use before 1/1/10 shall contain or use software that has not been certified by the EAC or the State. No voting system in use after 1/1/10 shall contain or use software not certified by the EAC.[29]
The EAC shall set up expedited certification for software additions and patches to existing voting systems, for use when there is inadequate time for normal certification, and may exempt commercial off-the-shelf software that is not "election-dedicated."
Wrong!
After 1/1/10, all voting systems must be certified by the EAC, giving them control of a vast marketplace and the conduct of elections nationwide.
The EAC shall establish guidelines for expedited certification of software changes for the next Federal election, allowing the use of untested changes.
Given past failures of the EAC to comply with its mission, and the presence or influence of vendors and other who are connected with past failures of certified equipment, this section is unwise.
Solution
Eliminate this section.
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