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Tag(s): Cheating; Congress; Democracy; Secret Vote Counting; Software; Voting
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September 3, 2007 at 16:20:25

Secret Disservice: HR 811

by Michael Collins Page 1 of 3 page(s)

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Michael Collins
Washington D.C.

At a New Jersey town meeting this July, Rep. Rush Holt (D-NJ) said of his bill, House Resolution 811, “It’s not my bill anymore.”

Why shouldn’t the world be safe for vendors? Microsoft in particular? After all, they pay the bills. Just let them have whatever they want and let the rest of us be thankful we’ve got jobs. This is the prevailing philosophy in Washington, DC, your capitol and the supposed heart of modern democracy.

House Resolution 811 (“The Holt Bill”) is coming up for a vote this week, word has it. The questions are stark. What will we Congress be voting for? Whose interests are represented in the final mark up of this legislation?

Voting in the United States is hardly inspirational. In fact, it’s become down right depressing for both those who follow it closely or those who keep their distance due to the dreadful outcomes in terms of legislative performance.

Let’s look at the close up. But first an acknowledgment. It’s hard arguing with those who say they wouldn’t let us vote if it made a difference because it hasn’t. It’s been eight months since the new Congress was seated and where are we? We’re still hip deep in Iraq and the Senate has done nothing to prevent the president from starting his next project, a military attack on Iran. We have no solutions to universal health insurance. and the rebuilding of New Orleans has been paid for but not begun. What a record! No wonder so many people don’t bother to vote.

For those of us who do vote, what is on the line with H.R. 811, the Holt Bill?

The Vendor Protection Act: Microsoft Uber Allis

A cardinal principal of almost all factions of the election integrity movement has been open computer source code for voting machines. Open source code is defined as, “…source code of software that is available to the general public with relaxed or non-existent intellectual property restrictions.” The basis for computerized voting machine software and methods could be examined by any citizen. As a result, it would be much easier to examine those nail biting elections we have so often or simply check on the integrity of any election, no matter how close. For the technically informed, this is one of the key elements required for transparent and fair elections where computerized voting (e-voting) is in place.

Advocates argue that open source computer code in voting machines will give greater access to understand how the machines operate. Quite simply, open source code will make it easier to assure that the votes cast are those counted. Not only will it be easier to check on any private vendor’s voting machine operations, with open source, this inspection will take place on an even playing field.

That was the original idea behind H.R. 811. The 2003 version of Holt’s bill was very clear. It stated:

No voting system shall at any time contain or use undisclosed software.

The bill, as introduced in 2006 was just as clear:

…source code, object code, executable representation, and ballot programming files [shall be made] available for inspection promptly upon request to any person.

The current version of Holt’s bill up for vote this week backs off of the public right to inspect voting machine software, open source code, in a big way and lets vendors keep secret the software and methods that determine your elections. Let me put it another way, you don’t get to see how the voting machines work that elect the officials who govern you – ever!

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http://electionfraudnews.com

Michael Collins is a writer who focuses on clean elections and voting rights. See this summary of his articles plus Election 2004: The Urban Legend and groundbreaking research and commentary in "" His web site, Election Fraud News & The Money Party, offers a collection of resources and commentary on critical issues facing the country.

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Bachelors of Science Degree in Computer Science and Business Administration with 25 years of experience working in the Independent Software Vendor Industry.
RunnerBachelors of Science Degree in Computer Science and Business Administration with 25 years of experience working in the Independent Software Vendor Industry.

State Election Law Allows Public Inspection of Ballots Boxes

Every state still has within their election code a provision that allows public observers the right to inspect physical ballot box containers and paper ballots before the polls open on Election Day. (Example: New Hampshire Election Code Section 658:36 Inspection of Ballot Box – At the opening of the polls, the ballot box shall be publicly opened and shown to be empty; and the election officers shall ascertain that fact by a personal examination of the box. eff. July 1, 1979) Every state still has within their election code a provision that allows public observers to watch election clerks open physical ballot box containers and count the paper ballots at the end of the election day.

Each and every DRE voting machine contains a software program that builds and displays the ballot image on its touch screen. Each and every DRE voting machine contains a software program that reads and stores in memory each voter's touch screen ballot voting selections. The software code together with the data storage drives and PC cards in each and every DRE voting machine is the equivalent of physical ballot box containers and paper ballots. Why can't judges, (i.e. Florida Circuit Court Judge William L. Gary who denied the plaintiffs motion to allow review of the source code for the paperless touch-screen machines used in the contested U.S. House race in Florida's 13th district between Democrat Christine Jennings and Republican Vern Buchanan) and lawmakers (i.e. House committee members who marked up House Resolution 811 to specifically deny the public’s right to inspect DRE ballot creation and counting software) understand the simply fact that the software code together with the data storage drives and PC cards in each and every DRE voting machine IS at once both the BALLOT and THE BALLOT BOX and the voting public has a right to inspect the ballot boxes and ballots both before and after each election?

Ballot box inspection laws are on the book of every state because in the past political partisans are known to have stuffed ballot boxes in a wide variety of ways. Why do judges and lawmakers think that political partisans will not and cannot stuff the DRE software ballot box. Stuffing the DRE software ballot box is so much easier than stuffing the old ballot box containers on election day.

It is so easy for any one of the small army of different computer programmers who writes code destined to run on each and every DRE system to stuff the software ballot box.

There are DRE system manufacture programmers that continually write code to fix software bugs and enhance system function. Then, typically local temporary contractor programmer are hired to install the software updates on the DRE's. Then, maybe, somebody else tests each and every DRE after the software updates are installed.

Typically local temporary contractor programmers are hired in each local election jurisdiction to write software that codifies all the all the ballots for the jurisdiction for a particular election. (This is the ballot image voters see on the DRE touch screen) These same local temporary contractor programmers then load the ballot software on each and every DRE machine. Then, maybe, the same contract programmers or somebody else tests each and every DRE.

Local election officials are not computer scientists and many have trouble even using the PC on their desk. They cannot adequately assess the competence and veracity lof ocal temporary contractor programmers. In actually they cannot verify that a contractor programmer's work is bug free or that they did not nefariously write ten lines of software that activates on election day to flip votes or rigs vote totals on a central tabulator and then self delete at the end of the election day.

So many computer programmers at different levels and so many DRE machine software updates. It is so easy for a political partisan to plant a few willing temporary contractor programmers in several key election jurisdictions to stuff the software ballot box. Or even just a few motivated partisan programmers working on their own could easily throw an election.

by Runner (9 articles, 34 quicklinks, 47 diaries, 33 comments) on Tuesday, September 4, 2007 at 10:08:52 AM