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Is the Bush
Doctrine Tenable?
Jesse Lee OpEdNews.Com
In the coming election George W. Bush will be billed as the
national security candidate. His
image in a jumpsuit on the Lincoln will be burned in America’s retinas. Polls have consistently shown that much of the public has
already accepted this characterization, and many have argued that this
will be an insurmountable problem for any Democrat, perhaps with the
exception of General Wesley Clark. However,
the test run of the Bush Doctrine is only now unfolding in its vast
implications and consequences, and a handful of extremely significant
problems remain with little hint of how they will be resolved.
Several of these problems have gone largely unmentioned in both the
media and on the Hill, but they may arise as serious questions if
Americans are forced to decide whether the Bush Doctrine is a tenable and
effective national security strategy.
1)WMD: The
recent controversy concerning the forged documents relating to Niger has
elevated the question of credibility to the level of a potential disaster
for the administration, whose explanations have met with much skepticism
as well as outright denial from critical individuals.
The possibility that the administration not only manipulated
intelligence but proceeded to issue what appear to be cover stories, has
many discussing the possibility of resignations in the highest levels of
the administration, up to and including Dick Cheney.
The issue has crystallized many suspicions from Bush’s opponents
about the intelligence case at large, and a prospective Democratic inquiry
would likely conclude that the claims about Iraq’s nuclear weapons
program and Al Qaeda connection were based on little or no credible
evidence. Both claims have
been refuted by international watchdog groups and intelligence agencies,
including Britain’s. These
investigations are important not so much for the sake of assessing blame
for deeds that are already done, but rather for assessing the competence
and integrity of intelligence for the further advancement of Bush’s
foreign policy agenda. As
George Will has argued, a policy of preemption relies on impeccable
intelligence assessments of potential threats, and cannot operate on
intelligence as flawed as that which the CIA and Rumsfeld’s Office of
Special Plans have produced.
But the greater problem for the Bush Doctrine may be the
possibility that Saddam did possess chemical or biological weapons.
If such weapons do still exist and are usable, then they are either
in the hands of terrorists already, or remain hidden some place where they
could be collected by anybody who knows where they are, and that person
could do with them as they pleased. The
one man who certainly knows where they are, and who has an unquenchable
desire for revenge on the U.S., Saddam Hussein, is still at large. It is distinctly possible that a war fought to
eliminate the threat of Saddam’s weapons has instead precipitated it
directly. Worse still, the
CIA warned of that exact possibility in the fall of 2002.
If the Bush Doctrine, which is ostensibly motivated by a desire to
aggressively eliminate threatening WMD does not have a method to contain
those weapons once action is taken, the policy becomes a reckless
endangerment of America’s citizens and interests, rather than a staunch
defense of them.
2)Troops
Stretched Thin: The
President has recently felt pressure to intervene in Liberia.
The move would presumably require a modest number of troops and an
even more modest number of casualties.
It would draw wide support across the world, and would serve to
quiet critics at home and abroad who have charged that Bush’s rhetoric
about “liberation” was purely a cover for ulterior motives in Iraq.
The problem that has emerged, however, is that American troops are
already stretched to thin to cover even such a minor operation.
News coverage in Iraq and testimonials from troops stationed there
reveal that America’s administration of the country is dangerously
understaffed, with only a few dozen troops being placed in charge of
entire towns who grant them no legitimacy in their rule.
In such a position, America is extremely vulnerable.
Any major war that erupts during the Iraq occupation, planned to be
at least 4-5 years, would quickly drain U.S. military capabilities, and
would immediately bring the resurrection of the draft.
The question of whether making such an enormous and debilitating
commitment of troops to eliminate a threat from Iraq, which now seems hazy
at best, is one that national security experts cannot ignore.
Afghanistan has already fallen back into a largely anarchic state,
and without more troops to secure the country from Warlords and terrorist
organizations, there is very little the U.S. can do.
Most importantly, the Bush Doctrine continues to maintain a stance
that it would rather go to war than make concessions to lesser powers.
While this posture may play well to American pride, America will be
ill-prepared if any country takes Bush up on the offer.
3)International
Opinion: It is nearly
universally acknowledged that much of Bush’s success in capturing
terrorists and preventing planned attacks is owed to international
cooperation. The vast majority of captures have occurred abroad in Europe
and Pakistan. If America
continues to assert itself as unchallenged hegemon, there can be little
doubt that it will hurt this cooperation.
In Europe, aggressive law enforcement efforts against terrorism
depend on funding, and at that critical time of crafting budgets, Bush’s
policies and attitudes will not be forgotten.
In Pakistan, Bush has created such animosity that continued support
from Musharraf increasingly puts his rule at risk, and there may be limits
to how much Musharraf can do while maintaining the minimal support
necessary for his regime to survive.
International polls have shown that international opinion of Bush,
and to a lesser extent the U.S., has plummeted.
In the Arab world approval ratings have dropped below 10% in many
nations. It is unfortunate,
and few citizens or politicians have been willing to wrestle with the fact
openly, but it is probable that the variable of Arab opinion has the
single greatest correlation to the seriousness of the threat of terrorism
directed at the United States. Bin
Laden’s recruiting platform, arguing that America is an aggressive
empire, has gained tremendous credence across the Middle East, and most
terrorism experts argue that America’s vulnerability has increased as a
result of Bush’s policies. The
administration combats this problem with claims that in the long term the
Bush Doctrine will ease tensions with the Middle East, but the poor
planning for the Iraq occupation has cast doubt on exactly how careful and
reliable such long-term plans might be.
4)Saudi Arabia:
The subject of Saudi Arabia has been kept quiet in Washington,
largely because so much of the Washington power structure is entwined in
various ways with the corrupt Saudi Royal family.
But the administration is in fact on a collision course with Saudi
Arabia. To be sure, they are
digging in their heels to prevent it, but it appears that it may be
inevitable. The problem
begins with the Saudi government’s support of terrorism, which has been
more a case of issuing protection money to save themselves than subversive
aggression towards the U.S. The
family’s hold on power is tenuous, and they must give concessions to the
fundamentalists to prevent a revolution.
If Islamists were to come into power, either through revolution or
democratic reform, it would spell disaster of the worst kind for this
administration. Approximately 35% of the world’s oil, on which America and
particularly the corporate class is utterly dependent, would fall into the
hands of America’s declared enemies.
The threat of cutting off or blowing up Saudi Arabia’s oil
industry would arguably be a deterrent equivalent to a nuclear bomb for
this administration, and it would completely undermine Bush’s posture of
domination without concession. Such a scenario could finally bring Middle
East doomsday warnings towards reality.
When Paul Wolfowitz recently stated that amongst many motivations
for the war in Iraq, removing bases from Saudi territory was “a big
one”, he meant that the administration was trying to sustain the rule of
the Saudi Royals by lowering Islamist tensions.
The propping up of the family has played no small part in fostering
a 3% U.S. approval rating amongst Saudi citizens, and the rage against the
corrupt regime is only growing stronger.
The administration will have no stronger urge to preempt a threat
than in this case, and a private defense briefing held by Richard Perle in
which a RAND Corporation representative advocated regime change in Saudi
Arabia and occupation of their oil fields is an indication that the
administration is already planning for this eventuality. While the threat
might be averted if American foreign policy demonstrated more concern for
Arab opinion, the Bush doctrine seems to have put the two nations on an
unalterable trajectory towards confrontation.
5)North Korea:
The public declaration and pursuit of the Bush Doctrine was
designed to intimidate foreign nations into submission and disarmament,
but in some cases it seems to have had an opposite effect.
North Korea, as well as perhaps Iran, has sprinted towards the
nuclear finish line. Even
many hawks now concede that North Korea has by now crossed the threshold
of a credible threat of force from America, as America could not initiate
a nuclear war. Kim Jong Il
now stands as the truest nuclear threat for America since the fall of the
Soviet Union. Again, the
threat could be eliminated if North Korea were given the aid it is
requesting, but the Bush Doctrine, which hinges on and is dependent upon a
posture of domination without concession, dictates that America must
suffer through an open-ended detente with North Korea which will cost a
great deal more than the aid Kim Jong Il is requesting.
While it would essentially be succumbing to blackmail, it seems
difficult to argue that America should instead allow the North Korean
dictator to expand and refine his nuclear program, and live with nuclear
weapons pointed at American soil with Kim Jong Il’s finger on the
trigger for possibly decades on end.
Again, the Bush Doctrine plays well to American pride, but for the
next election Americans might have to soul-search in order to decide
whether clinging to pride is worth the risk.
There are more general questions as well: Since Saddam Hussein did
not pose an immanent threat, and “liberation” was clearly an
afterthought, what then were the true motivations?
If it comes to choosing between forfeiting control over Iraq, its
oil, and military bases on the one hand, and rising American casualties on
the other, what will this administration do?
Why has the international community not been allowed to share the
burden of reconstruction? Who
forged the uranium documents in the first place (Chalabi’s INC is a
likely suspect)? Can America stand like a “colossus straddling the globe”
if the nation has no credibility left?
The Bush Doctrine is revolutionary, and it is
easy to forget that as such it is a grand experiment. Now that the test run is unfolding, these problems loom
large, and so far the administration has given no hint of having solutions
at hand. As of now media
attention and political criticism remain localized on hot button issues,
but by November, 2004 Bush may have to defend his his revolution as
a whole.
Jesse Lee is a recent graduate of Trinity College in Hartford with a
degree in Political Science and Philosophy. He works as a paralegal in
Washington, D.C. where he was born and raised. He also volunteers with
MoveOn and The Education for Peace in Iraq Center (EPIC). He
encourages your comments at kirkout79@hotmail.com.
This
article is copyright by Jesse Lee and originally
published by opednews.com but
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